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the pre- and post-EGSR skill grade flow rates and pay grade structure data used in the 
research.  The current Marine Corps enlisted grade structure is compared to the proposed 
enlisted grade structure from the August 27, 2002 Officer and Enlisted Grade Structure 
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support the Marine Corps’ operating forces.  Marine Corps operational readiness is 
increased when the number of Marines in the lower pay grades are available in sufficient 
numbers to support the next immediate pay grade.  The research shows that a pyramidal 
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The Enlisted Grade Structure Review (EGSR) is a five-month collaboration 
among manpower planners and Marine operational forces with the goal of creating 
pyramidal MOS grade shapes in the Table of Manpower Requirements.1  The EGSR has 
a profound effect on the First Term Alignment Plan (FTAP)- the tool the Marine Corps 
uses to retain a predetermined number of high quality first-term Marines.  The purpose of 
this research is to evaluate the impact of the Enlisted Grade Structure Review on First 
Term Alignment Plan retention requirements.  To gain a better understanding of the 
implications of implementing the proposed grade structure, we examine the enlisted 
grade structure and the process of determining reenlistment billets within the Marine 
Corps.  In addition to discussing the objectives and the intent behind grade shaping, we 
compare FTAP retention requirements with respect to the current enlisted grade structure 
and the proposed enlisted grade structure from the August 27, 2002 Officer and Enlisted 
Grade Structure Review.  This research provides insight to Marine Corps planners in 
determining whether the EGSR’s proposed billet assignments increase FTAP retention 
efficiency. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Marine Corps relies heavily on the leadership of experienced Marines to 
accomplish its complex missions.  Retention of knowledgeable Marines is necessary to 
obtain the correct number of people with the proper skill level at the appropriate time in 
order to carry out organizational human resource needs.2  If the quality of retained 
Marines does not match the quality of Marine FTAP billets, then the Marine Corps, as a 
whole, is less efficient resulting in reduced readiness in fulfilling its required missions. 
Headquarters, Marine Corps, Manpower Plans Division uses recruiting and 
retention to shape the career force.  Changes in first-term retention rates can significantly 
impact the ability of the Marine Corps to achieve its career manning goals.  The success 
                                                 
1 The Table of Manpower Requirements is an automated system that captures and displays documents 
that describe organizational manpower requirements. 
2 United States Marine Corps. “FY02 First Quarter Enlisted Retention Update.” Marine Administrative 
Message 045/02. 
1 
of meeting manning goals is particularly important since the military service is a closed 
system.  In contrast to the civilian sector that can hire employees into their structure at 
any hierarchical level, the military has an internal labor market in which each individual 
starts at an entry-level position.  Reduction in first-term retention rates can create a 
shortage of skilled personnel.  The spillover effect from the shortage of experienced 
personnel produces an unwarranted demand on accession requirements.  At least one 
additional contract must be written for each individual that is not retained.3  Since the 
internal labor market of the Marine Corps prohibits lateral hiring of replacements into 
pay grades above E3, there can be a substantial wait-time between recruitment and 
replacement.  
According to Marine Administrative Message 556/02, the Marine Corps 
implemented the Enlisted Career Force Controls (ECFC) Program in 1985 to ensure 
Marines of the appropriate grade and military occupational specialty (MOS) fill FTAP 
retention requirements.4  The objectives of the ECFC are to more efficiently manage the 
ever-increasing number of the career force; shape the inventory of Marines by MOS and 
grade to Marine Corps’ requirements; and control retention in order to provide an equal 
promotion opportunity across all MOS’s.  Table 1 shows the time in service (TIS) 
promotion targets for sergeants through sergeants major. 
 
TABLE 1. PROMOTION TARGETS 
Pay Grade 
Average  
Time In Service 
E-5 4 Years 
E-6 8.5 Years 
E-7 13 Years 
E-8 17.5 Years 
E-9 22 Years 
Source:  From Marine Administrative Message 556/02 
                                                 
3 Sean A. Kerr, “Retention of First-Term and Second-Term Marine Corps Enlisted Personnel.” p 1. 
       4 Marine Corps Administrative Message 556/02. 
 
2 
The EGSR and the FTAP are two of the various programs and policies that 
support the ECFC objectives.  The EGSR is conducted to ensure that each MOS has a 
logical pyramidal shape that facilitates equal promotion opportunity in a timely manner 
across the Marine Corps.  The EGSR determines, by MOS, the number of billets in each 
pay grade.  Based upon the career force structure requirements and estimated inventory, 
the FTAP is a fiscal year manpower plan that specifies the number of first term Marines 
by primary MOS (PMOS) the Marine Corps must reenlist to become part of the career 
force.  Each year since the inception of the FTAP, the Marine Corps has experienced a 
minor rise in the number of first term Marines to be retained for transition into the career 
force.  As the career force increases in size relative to the total force, the Marine Corps 
must not only increase its Manpower budget, but also examine the implications of an 
older and potentially less mobile force.5 
Fiscal Year 2002 marks the ninth consecutive year the Marine Corps has 
reenlisted in excess of the required number of Marines to sustain the career force.6  The 
Marine Corps’ Quality Reenlistment Program7 takes into account those Marines who are 
reenlisted in excess of FTAP billets.  This program allows the Personnel Management 
Division Director to retain top performing Marines and acknowledges the inaccuracy of 
the planning process. 
TABLE 2. BY YEAR COMPARISON OF REENLISTMENT 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Reenlistment population 20,943 22,072 24,000 21,824 23,029 21,977
FTAP Billets 4057 4296 4600 4634 5480 5791
Reenlistment (%) 19.4 19.5 19.2 21.5 23.8 26.6
Actual Reenlisted 4061 4300 4615 4709 5481 5846
Actual Reenlisted (%) 100.10 100.09 100.33 101.62 100.02 100.95
Source:  Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Years 1998 – 2000. 
                                                 
5 This is an area for future research. 
       6 Garry L. Parks.  “Statement By Lieutenant General Garry L. Parks, United States Marine Corps 
Deputy Commandant For Manpower and Reserve Affairs Before The Military Personnel Subcommittee Of 
The Armed Services Committee.”  13 March 2002.  Navy Office of Information. 
7 Explained in Chapter 3, section 4, subparagraph d. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
During this thesis we address the following primary question:  What is the 
functional relationship between the EGSR and the FTAP retention requirements?  As the 
Marine Corps is dependent upon its ability to recruit, train, promote, and retain Marines, 
the Marine Corps must have more billets at lower pay grades than at higher pay grades.  
The Corps then uses two tools to shape each primary military occupational specialty 
(PMOS):  (1) Marines exiting of their own volition; and (2) the EGSR which determines 
the number of FTAP billets.  The results should be the typical pyramidal shape that 
dominates military labor markets. Those PMOSs that are not distributed according to a 
pyramidal shape warrant special attention.     
We will address two secondary questions in this thesis.  The first question is: Why 
has the number of FTAP billets increased over time?  The required number of FTAP 
reenlistment billets has increased over the past eight years.  If FTAP billets grow over 
time relative to the total force, the Marine Corps may age over time.  Understanding why 
the number of FTAP billets has increased is important to understanding whether the 
recent grade structure review addresses this potential problem.   
The second question is:  How does the EGSR affect the grade structure in military 
occupational specialties that are manned below stated requirements?  If the EGSR is 
working properly, we should observe a rapid response to those MOSs who are under 
(over) staffed.  The EGSR should not only work quickly to address shortages and 
surpluses, but it should also address flaws in the pyramidal structure of MOSs.  The goal 
of the EGSR is not to create “faces” for the “spaces” but to create a pyramid of “spaces” 
for the “faces.” 
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  In Chapter II, we examine 
literature in manpower economics to gain a better understanding of the economic 
environment within which the Marine Corps operates.  Included in this chapter is a 
discussion on social factors that affect military personnel retention.  We discuss retention 
in the armed forces of the United States, Canada, and Australia.  We investigate elements 
4 
of the Enlisted Career Force Controls (ECFC) Program in Chapter III.  We discuss in 
detail the intent, purpose, and process of the EGSR, and the FTAP.  We conclude with an 
examination of the FTAP model.  In Chapter IV, we explain the pre- and post- EGSR 
skill grade flow rates and pay grade structure data used in this research.  In addition, we 
discuss the impact of the EGSR on the FTAP retention requirements of thirteen MOSs 

















II. FIRST-TERM RETENTION IN ALL VOLUNTEER FORCES 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) defines ‘retention rate’ as the 
percentage of personnel who reenlist or extend among those who reach a reenlistment or 
extension decision date within the 18-month period that begins at the start of the fiscal 
year.  DMDC also defines reenlistment rate as “the percentage of personnel who make a 
new obligation of 25 months or more, relative to the population nearing the end of a 
service obligation and not extending.”8  Therefore, retention includes those who reenlist 
or extend, and reenlistment includes only those who reenlist. 
Retention, however, is dependent upon many factors, some of which are 
exogenous to Marine Corps retention policy.  At the service level, national defense policy 
and priorities; the transformation of the force structure; relative pay and benefits to the 
civilian sector; and other factors influence not only the number of billets available for 
retention purposes but also the internal climate that influences a Marine’s decision to stay 
in the force.  External conditions to include the overall state of the civilian economy; job 
opportunities in the civilian sector and the overall threat climate may also influence the 
retention decision.  The objective of this chapter is to examine recruitment and retention 
policies in the United States and other countries.  We pay specific attention to the enlisted 
recruitment and retention policies of the United State Marine Corps.  We believe that this 
examination is necessary to provide a foundation for the analysis in subsequent chapters.   
The structure of this chapter is as follows:  In the first section, we discuss the 
internal labor market and how it influences the retention rate.  In the next section, we 
compare the retention of all four branches of the United States military.  Lastly, we will 
discuss retention of Australian and Canadian military forces. 
A. MANPOWER ECONOMICS 
In this section we provide a brief overview of the workings of the internal labor 
market in an all-volunteer force.  We first discuss the position of the armed forces relative 
                                                 
8 Arkes, Jeremy.  “Military Recruiting and Retention After the Fiscal Year 2000 Military Pay 
Legislation.”  RAND Corporation.  2002:  69. 
7 
to the civilian labor forces.  We then briefly examine the impact of higher education on 
recruitment and retention.  We conclude with the role of the military in the labor market. 
The labor market consists of all the buyers and sellers of labor services.  In 1998, 
the labor force participation rate9 of approximately sixty-seven percent was substantially 
higher than the prevailing rate of approximately sixty percent prior to 1980.10  We can 
conclude that more of the population of the United States was actively employed in the 
civilian sector in the 1990s relative to early periods in time.  During this period we 
believe the external environment was not conducive to recruitment and retention efforts, 
as numerous opportunities existed in the civilian sector.  The downsizing of the force 
compounded the negative impact of external economic conditions. 
Since the volunteer armed force is the largest single employer of young men and 
women in the United States, it holds an important position in the American youth labor 
market.  The military quickly declined in size in 1987 after a rapid increase in the early 
1980s.  Between 1989 and 1992, the number of accessions (new entrants) declined by 
twenty-seven percent.  This reduction in force led to significant losses of employment 
opportunities.11  This combination of internal and external forces increased the difficulty 
of recruiting young men and women, increasing the importance of retaining those 
servicemembers already on active duty. 
1. Unemployment Rate 
The unemployment rate is defined as the ratio of those unemployed to those in the 
labor force.  When the United States’ unemployment rate is approximately five percent, 
the labor market is regarded as relatively “tight”.12  Overall, this indicates that jobs are 
plentiful and hard for employers to fill and that most of those who are unemployed can 
find work quickly.  When this occurs, military retention decreases because there are more 
employment opportunities in the civilian sector. 
                                                 
9 Labor force participation rate equates to the labor force divided by the population. 
10 Ehrenberg and Smith, “Modern Labor Economics.”  27-28. 
11 Angrist, Joshua.  “Estimating the Labor Market Impact of Voluntary Military Service Using Social 
Security Data on Military Applicants.”  Econometrica 66 (1998):  249. 
12 Ehrenbrg, Ronald G. and Robert S. Smith.  “Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy.”  
Addison Wesley.  Seventh Edition.  (2000):  28. 
8 
The private sector and the military compete for the same kind of high-aptitude 
high school graduates the military needs to fill its ranks as it advances towards a 
technological proficient future.  In the 1990s, it was difficult to attract and retain high 
quality personnel.  Table Three shows the annual average labor force data of the United 
States from 1990 to 2002.  The acceleration in the economy throughout the 1990’s, 
particularly from 1993, resulted in an increased opportunity for employment for young 
people outside the military.13 
When the term “full employment” is used, it does not mean that each and every 
person seeking employment is gainfully employed at a specific point in time.  Some 
percentage of the labor force can be expected to be unemployed at any given point in 
time due to structural14 or frictional15 conditions.  Many economists believe that the full 
employment rate in the United States is between four and six percent of the labor force at 
any given point in time. 
When the employment rate approaches the full employment rate, civilian labor 
market conditions can be characterized as “tight” or having insufficient slack to adjust to 
new demands for labor without significant increases in wages.  In this environment, 
military wage growth may fall behind wage growth in the civilian sector; placing the 
military services at a disadvantage when attempting to recruit new talent and retain 
existing servicemembers.  Conversely, when the external economic environment is poor, 
that is, the unemployment is relatively higher compared to past values, the military may 
have a plethora of individuals willing to join the service and remain in the service. 
2. The Effect of College-Bound People on Retention 
Kilburn and Klerman (1999) argue that although the unemployment rate remains 
constant, another risk to military retention is the continual increase in financial benefits 
and earning potential that young people experience by attending college.  The growth of 
                                                 
13 Kilburn, Rebecca and Jacob A. Klerman.  “Enlistment Decisions in the 1990s:  Evidence from 
Individual-Level Data.”  RAND Corporation. 1999.  16. 
14 As the economy develops over time the type of industries may change as well, therefore structural 
unemployment occurs when the structure of industry changes. 
15 Frictional unemployment occurs when a person either loses their job or chooses to leave it and has 
to look for another one.  Frictional unemployment refers to the time between jobs. 
9 
interest in higher education poses two choices for the military; either try harder to recruit 
from a smaller pool of high quality youths or accommodate an apparent shift toward 
higher education by offering education incentives.16  
Kilburn and Klerman (1999) found that the rate of college attendance and aptitude 
scores among 18-19 year-olds grew dramatically between 1980 and 1992.  In 1980, forty-
six percent of the 18-19 year-old age group had enrolled in college.  By 1992, the amount 
had increased almost thirty-three percent to over sixty-one percent.  High school seniors 
were considered “higher quality” since the number of individuals scoring CAT I – IIIA 
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)17 increased during the same period.18 
According to Karoly and Klerman (1995), society’s view of young people’s work 
ethic after leaving high school is that they are “hanging out,” that is, they hold many 
different jobs until their mid-to-late twenties. The perceived high turnover rate 
discourages employers to hire people in this age category, in fear that they will soon quit 
leaving the company to train another individual.  Karoly and Klerman also stated that it is 
good to change jobs if the change leads to a better fit for both the employee and the 
employer, but usually people find new jobs to receive more income.19 
In summary, we argue that external factors that are beyond the control of the 
services influence recruitment and retention.  We argue that there is an inverse correlation 
between the unemployment rate and retention rates; similarly between unemployment 
and recruitment.  The increased rates of participation in higher education also appear to 
negatively influence recruitment and retention.  While the services can alter their 
incentives (bonuses, educational opportunities) to induce (reduce) recruitment and 
retention, this is dependent upon the needs of the services.  More specifically the EGSR 
and the resulting FTAP should acknowledge the internal and external environmental 
conditions and adjust incentives accordingly. 
                                                 
16 Ibid.  p. 18. 
17 Armed Forces Qualification Test score table is provided in Appendix A. 
18 Ibid. p. 18. 
19 Keroly and Klerman.  p.1. 
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3. Servicemembers’ Commitment to Military 
Servicemembers must feel a sense of devotion to the military in which they 
currently serve in order to remain on active duty.  Sixty-nine percent of the total active 
duty population consists of junior and mid-grade enlisted personnel.  A recent survey of 
junior and mid-grade enlisted personnel found that only forty-two percent appear to be 
satisfied with the military way of life.20  Thirty-eight percent of the population stated that 
basic pay would be the main reason for leaving the military.  Among all four branches of 
service, an average of thirty-six point seven percent reported that they were not satisfied 
with the leadership quality.  Sixty-five and seventy-five percent of servicemembers think 
total compensation and amount of family/personal time, respectively, is better in the 
civilian world than in the military.21  Most servicemembers, in fact, did not plan on 
making the military a career when they first enlisted.22  Another survey of 
servicemembers found that forty-seven percent did not know what they intended to do 
upon enlistment; twenty-six percent planned to leave after their first obligation; and 
twenty-seven percent planned to retire, but the study showed that only sixteen percent 
found some kind of commitment to stay.23  We argue that servicemembers decide to 
remain in the military only if they feel either a sense of “staying power” or commitment 
to the organization. 
When a servicemember decides to leave the military they lack the following 
qualities: 
• A strong belief in or acceptance of the military’s goals and values 
• A willingness to put forth significant efforts on behalf of the military 
• A definite desire to remain in the military24 
Military retention rates are affected by servicemembers’ satisfaction with the 
internal elements of the organization. When policymakers know what variables 
                                                 
20 “The Wild Card Effect and Military Retention.”  Defense Manpower Data Center.  p. 2. 
21 Ibid.  p. 2. 
22 United States General Accounting Office. “Perceptions of Retention-Critical Personnel Are Similar to Those of 
Other Enlisted Personnel.  p. 6. 
23 Ibid.  p. 6. 
24 “The Wild Card Effect and Military Retention.”  Defense Manpower Data Center.  p. 4. 
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negatively influence a servicemember’s decision to leave the military; they can tailor 
their retention messages and aim retention program incentives to counteract these 
variables. 
B. A SURVEY OF RETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
FORCES 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of the Cold War, the 
justification for maintaining a large active-force appeared to collapse as well.  
Policymakers began to argue what to do with the peace dividend, that is, the savings 
resulting from a massive reduction in the size of the Defense Department’s budget. 
In response to the end of the Cold War, a reduction in force began in 1992.  Total 
active duty strength declined from 1,985,550 in 1991 to 1,413,577 in 2002.  As total 
active duty strength declined, the number of new entrants declined accordingly.  During 
this period, retention policy was, we argue, more often used to reduce the force rather 
than as a tool of managing total manpower within each MOS.  After the drawdown in end 
strength that appeared to end in 1999, retention became an even more important 
manpower management tool, as the pool of trained personnel in the internal labor market 
was much smaller. 
Attrition affects retention such that when attrition is high, the prerequisite 
standard of quality for those servicemembers who are retained is lowered.  Provided 
accession targets remain constant, in order to accomplish retention goals, the quality 
standard is lowered because the military is pressured into retaining the same number of 
service members from a smaller population pool.  Not all service members who attrit are 
of lesser quality; some are high quality that leave the military force for reasons beyond 
their control, such as medical or family problems.   
Retention has been an ongoing problem for all services since FY97.  The Army 
and the Marine Corps seem to have less of a retention problem than the Navy and Air 
Force.  Military manpower analysts believe three factors contributed to these problems:  a 
robust civilian economy; a post-Cold War increase in peacetime deployments; and the 
management of the defense drawdown.  First, the latter half of the 1990s provided 
attractive employment opportunities for servicemembers, especially for those who were 
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well-educated or possessed highly technical skills.  In certain civilian industries such as 
the airline industry, the heightened demand for trained workers had an adverse effect on 
military retention.  Secondly, the increased number of peacetime deployments after the 
Cold War took service members away from their families.  This caused undue stress on 
family members.  Lastly, by reducing accessions and retention of junior enlisted 
personnel, mismanagement of human resources during the drawdown of the early 1990s 
reduced end-strength by 33 percent.  This meant that a larger portion of the smaller 
cohort had to be retained.25   The retention rates from 1993 to 1996 were comparable to 
the rates in the 1970s after the Vietnam War downsizing, which was the lowest ever 
recorded.26   
The following four sections discuss retention and reenlistment rates of each 
branch of the U. S. military and how each one defines retention-critical occupational 
fields.   
1. Army 
The Army Retention Program is a crucial component to manning the Army’s 
warfighting units and meeting end-strength.  The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
determines retention aims.  Retention objectives are issued to major commands on a 
quarterly basis that, in turn, issue the objectives to their subordinate commands.  These 
aims primarily focus on the Army’s initial and mid term soldiers who have not made the 
decision or commitment for a full twenty-year career with additional emphasis on 
soldiers who have an expiration term of service within the current fiscal year.27 
The Army defines retention as a process designed to sustain the military with 
qualified and experienced personnel in order to reduce attrition and support the National 
Military Strategy.28  The Army’s first-term retention rate was approximately forty 
percent in FY96-97, and decreased to thirty-eight percent in FY99 and FY00.  In FY01, 
                                                 
25 Arkes, Jeremy.  “Military Recruiting and Retention After the Fiscal Year 2000 Military Pay 
Legislation.”  RAND Corporation.  2002:  p. 67-69. 
26 Abstract Cutoff.  p. 1-2. 
27 http://www.perscom.army.mil/Enlist/guide.htm 
28 Army Career Management Field-79, Chapter 28. 
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the Army stated that it had met all of its enlisted retention goals for the last three 
consecutive years.29 
In certain skills, the Army continues to have a shortage of sergeants.  To rectify 
this problem the Army implemented the Special Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
Alignment Promotion Program on October 1, 1999.  This program allows E-4s who are 
promotable and serving in an MOS that has a low promotion rate compared to other 
MOSs, the opportunity to reenlist for the retraining option or to request reclassification 
into a selected MOS.  After completion of training and the designation of the new MOS, 
the soldier is promoted on the first day of the month following the completion of 
training.30    
The Army deemed the 12 occupations listed in Table Four as critical to 
retention.31  These occupations are usually staffed at ten percent below the Army average 
by grade and occupation.32  Therefore, in order to help keep soldiers who are currently 
serving in critical-retention MOSs on active duty, the Army has several programs to help 
retain its enlisted force: 
a. Excellence in Retention Program (ERP) 
Implemented on January 1, 1992, the Excellence in Retention Program 
(ERP) is designed to retrain soldiers who are approaching their end of active obligated 
service and are serving in an overstrength military occupational specialty (MOS). Once 
an MOS is recognized as overstrength, the Reenlistment Management Branch submits a 
request to the career management field analyst in Training Division to provide planned 
authorizations and operating strengths for each MOS by skill level and aggregate.33 
 
 
                                                 
29 Arkes, Jeremy.  “Military Recruiting and Retention After the Fiscal Year 2000 Military Pay 
Legislation.”  RAND Corporation.  2002:  70. 
30 https://www.perscom.army.mil/Enlist/guide/htm 
31 GAO Report 2001. 
32“Perceptions of Retention-Critical Personnel Are Similar to Those of Other Enlisted Personnel.”  
United States Government Accounting Office.  June 2001:  21.  
33 “Excellence in Retention Program.” January 15, 2003.   
<http://www.perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf> 
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b. Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) 
The MOS designated for the SRB is announced by message from the 
Commander of Personnel Command.  The SRB program is a retention incentive paid to 
soldiers in particular MOSs who reenlists for a minimum of three years.  The objective of 
the program is to increase the number of reenlistments in critical MOSs that do not have 
adequate retention levels to man the career force.  The Department of the Army can pay 
soldiers up to six times their monthly pay at discharge, times the number of additional 
obligated years of service up to $20,000.  The Army has three zones for which it pays its 
soldiers:  Zones A, B, and C.  A qualified soldier is paid an SRB only once within each 
eligibility zone.  In contrast, soldiers reenlisting for Indefinite Status do not receive an 
SRB.34  
c. Bonus Extension and Retraining (BEAR) 
The term “reclassification” is any action that changes a soldier’s Primary 
Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS).  The general categories in which a soldier can 
be reclassified are voluntary; mandatory/involuntary; fast track/branch initiative; and 
Department of the Army-directed.  The main difference in reclassifying categories is the 
processing method necessary to reach a decision.  For instance, voluntary reclassification, 
along with fast track/ branch initiatives is an assignment from an “overage” (an MOS that 
has too many soldiers) to a “shortage” (an MOS that has too few soldiers).  The hierarchy 
for determining a new MOS is within the soldier’s current career management field, 
career branch, career division and then the needs of the Army.  To be reclassified under 
Department of the Army-directed, a decision to determine the new MOS each soldier is 
reclassified into is required.  The soldier is then retrained in the new MOS.  The 
eligibility for MOS training and PMOS reclassification is based on each soldier’s 
qualification as defined by regulatory policy.35 
d. Broken Service Selective Reenlistment Bonus (BSSRB) 
This program became effective April 1, 1988 with the objective to 
increase the level of mid-career soldiers in specific MOSs that possess retention-critical 
                                                 
34 United States Army Publishing Agency.  “Army Retention Program.”  Document Number AR 601-
280.  <http://books.usapa.belvoir.army.mil/cgi-bin/bookmgr/BOOKS/R601_280/5.5> 
35 “The Army Retention Program.”  http://www.perscom.army.mil/Enlist/guide.htm.  
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skills.  The bonus is offered to prior service Army soldiers who were qualified in the 
bonus skill immediately prior to their last discharge or release from active duty.  The 
soldier must also agree to reenter the Army in that skill.  The BSSRB does not contain all 
MOSs in the SRB program, yet it mainly targets Special Forces, military intelligence and 
high technological MOSs.  In some instances, the multiplier level is one level lower than 
those listed for the current SRB program.36 
2. Navy 
The Navy has stated that since these cohorts are smaller as a result of the 
drawdown, it needs to increase its rate of retention among junior and mid-career 
personnel, yet the Navy claims that it has made great achievement over its retention 
problem.  The Navy’s retention rate was 33 percent in FY95, then increased to around 37 
percent in the late 1990s, and increased again to 43 percent in FY00.  The increase in the 
Navy’s retention rate reflects the effects of a widened Navy Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus (SRB) Program implemented in the late 1990s.  Other than the increase from 32 
percent in FY97 to 35 percent in FY98 and to 33 percent in FY99, the first-term 
reenlistment rate remained fairly stable over FY95-99.37 
The Navy defines retention-critical occupations as “any occupation filled 
significantly below authorized levels, traditionally hard to fill, difficult to train, strategic 
due to skills required, and having the greatest number of opportunities in the private 
sector.”  Table Five shows the 10 occupations the Navy deemed critical to retention 
(GAO Report 22). 
The Navy’s Center for Career Development (CCD) conducts retention “Best 
Practices” briefings during command visits and retention summits throughout its force.  
The briefs are designed to share ideas and procedure developed by commands which 
have made major steps toward the reduction of attrition while increasing retention.  The 
CCD compiled the below list of best practices from sailors’ ideas in the fleet: 
• Promote retention team interaction among commanding officers/ 
executive officers; command master chiefs/ command career counselor; department 
                                                 
36 Ibid.   
37 Asch 69-70. 
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heads/ leading chief petty officers/chief petty officer and the OMBUDSMAN (an 
individual who compiles concerns for enlisted personnel and relates it to the commanding 
officer) 
• Encourage commanding officers to periodically participate in professional 
development boards 
• Encourage commanding officers to make personal contact with members 
who are tentative in their career decision 
• Encourage commanding officers to write a letter to a spouse or parent of a 
sailor who is still undecided about a career choice.  This will enhance the communication 
line between the command and the spouse or parents. 
• Push the reenlistment forms down to the sailor and have them either 
accept or deny it.38 
Just as the Army has an SRB program, so does the Navy.  According to 
OPNAVINST 1160.6A, the Navy’s SRB program is used to increase the number of 
reenlistments in ratings and Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes having insufficient 
supply of personnel.  At least every six months, the Navy reviews its ratings/ NECs to 
determine which one is authorized an SRB.  As retention improves in an NEC or rating, 
the award levels are reduced or eliminated to make more SRB funds available for other 
ratings.39 
Another program the Navy has is the Location Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
(LSRB).  This program provides an additional SRB award level to sailors who are SRB-
eligible and receive orders to designated locations.  An individual who is not eligible for 
an SRB could accept orders to an LSRB location and qualify for an LSRB award.  The 
award is applied to the entire length of the enlistment contract, and the servicemember 
must complete the entire tour of duty for the location.40 
                                                 
38 “Retention Best Practices from the Fleet ”  United States Navy Administrative Message 028/01. 
39 OPNAVINST 1160.6A.  May 28, 1987.  Department of the Navy.  Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 
40 “Location Selective Reenlistment Bonus (LSRB).”  United States Navy Administrative Message 
301/02. 
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3. Air Force  
The Air Force retained 89 percent of its eligible personnel in FY96, which was an 
increase of three percentage points over FY95.41  From FY95 to FY99, the Air Force 
witnessed a decline in its first-term retention.  As shown in Table Eight, their retention 
rate fell by five percentage points, and reported first-term retention rates well below 
target in FY97 through FY99.  In comparing retention and reenlistment rates in Tables 
Eight and Nine respectively, the Air Force first-term reenlistment rate fell by more than 
what the retention rate fell by.  This means more people extended than reenlisted during 
these years.  The second quarter of FY01 marked the first time the Air Force met its 
retention goal since the last quarter of FY98.42   
Although the Air Force normally does not label its occupations as retention-
critical, it identified the 21 occupations listed in Table Six.  Instead of naming 
occupations as retention-critical, efforts are made to retain all personnel regardless of 
specialty.  Their focus is cumulative reenlistment goals based on years of service rather 
than occupation.  According to Air Force officials, sustainment periods provide the basis 
for reenlistment goals.43 
Enlisted retention trends remain a concern with emphasis on retaining first and 
second-term airmen.  For the first time in three years, the Air Force exceeded its first-
term reenlistment goal.  To help retain a highly trained and qualified force, The Air Force 
has initiatives in place to foster improved retention 
The Air Force has its version of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) 
Program.  The program is a monetary incentive pad to eligible enlisted servicemembers 
to attract critical military skills to sustain the career force in those skills.  Headquarters of 
the United States Air Force updates the SRB lists as requirements change.  The intention 
of the program is to ensure the Air Force retains only airmen who consistently 
demonstrate the capability and willingness to maintain high professional standards.44  
                                                 
41 Abstract Cutoff. 
42 Asch p. 69-70 
43 GAO Report p. 19. 
44 http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/enlskills/reenlistments.htm 
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The Air Force also expanded its SRB authorization to more MOSs.  In FY99 it authorized 
135 specialties for an SRB for a total of ($74 million); in FY00 152 specialties for ($124 
million); in FY01 154 specialties for ($165 million); and in FY02 161 specialties for 
($285 million). 
4. Marine Corps  
The Marine Corps retention rate remained favorably constant at 83 percent for 
FY95 and FY96.45According to a Rand study, Lieutenant General Parks stated that the 
Marine Corps continued to manage its retention situation effectively.46  As depicted in 
Figure 2, the Marine Corps’ first-term retention rate remained steady at approximately 
twenty-one percent in FY95-99, and then rose to twenty-five percent in FY00. 
Table Eight lists the thirteen occupations that the Marine Corps considered 
retention-critical.  Each occupation’s strategic importance and the difficulty it has 
retaining personnel in the occupation is the basis of retention-critical occupations 
according to the Marine Corps.47 
C. A SURVEY OF RETENTION IN FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES  
Many of the factors influencing retention in the U.S. Armed Forces pose similar 
problems for armed forces in other countries.  Retention rates appear to decline after a 
unit has served on a peacekeeping tour.  Retention rates in the United States seem to 
decline after peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Bosnia.48  Australia witnessed 
similar occurrences after deployments in support of International Forces in East Timor 
(INTERFET).   
1. Canadian Military Forces 
According to the Auditor General of Canada, essential military occupations in the 
Canadian Force have crucial shortages.  Figure One shows that the trained effective 
                                                 
45 Abstract Cutoff. 
46 Asch p. 68. 
47 GAO p. 21 
48 “Retention of Military Personnel- Australian Defence Force.”  Australian National Audit Office.  
January 6, 2003. 
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strength49 of the military population has fallen from 92 percent in 1992 to 90 percent in 
2001 and is projected to decline to 80 percent by 2004.  Furthermore, intradepartmental 
predictions showed that the trained effective strength could fall below 80 percent by 
2004.50   
The military population is also not uniformly distributed.  There are not enough 
effectively trained personnel to fill the 3,300 vacant positions in 72 of its mission critical 
occupations.  However, the Canadian military force continues to disseminate recruits into 
21 of their overstaffed occupations such as cooks, stewards, and communications 
researchers while vehicle and weapons technicians, engineers, doctors, dentists and other 
key occupations are understaffed.51   
Although the Canadian Force has begun to address the retention issue, as the 
population of the force gets older and service members are eligible to exit, the military 
may lose more and more of its experienced and skilled personnel.52  The Auditor General 
of Canada stated that it could take up to thirty years to fix the gaps in the military labor 
force since people enter the military at entry level positions only.53 
According a Canadian Auditor General Office report, Canada’s downsizing of 
national defense in the mid-1990s caused their military labor supply shortage of today.  
The reduction in force created a deficiency of experienced manpower personnel to 
manage human resources.  Defense officials are concerned that only a small amount of 
military personnel, who are responsible for military human resource management, have 
prior experience or training in human resource policies and practices.  Although there are 
opportunities for service members who are filling these billets to receive human resource 
instruction, a knowledgeable group that is trained and experienced in human resource 
management is more beneficial to the Canadian Force.54  The Auditor General of Canada 
stated, “Human resource expertise is the missing ingredient.  The military must make a 
                                                 
49 Trained effective strength is defined as the quantity of people in the military who are trained for 
duty. 
50 Office of the Auditor General. p. 1-3. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid.  p. 30. 
54 Ibid. 
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fundamental change in the way it manages its human resources if these urgent personnel 
shortages are to be fixed.”  
The April 2002 Report also declared that, the Canadian Forces realizes the urgent 
need to rectify the shortages created by previous human resource practices.  As part of a 
three-year recruiting strategy, the Defense Department wants to more than double its 
yearly intake of regular force servicemembers from 2,500 to 7,000.  Prior manpower 
policies created rises and falls in the allocation of the military population that produced 
some gaps in rank and age distribution and in experience.55   
The Canadian Forces are looking at retention options to entice their highly skilled 
and experienced people to remain in service.  Below are some of the incentives to retain 
servicemembers: 
• Extending the compulsory retirement age to 60 years  
• Instituting pay increases 
• Creating a center to care for injured personnel 
• Improvements to military housing 
• Family support projects 
• An additional allowance for pilots 
Additionally, the target time for completion of a military occupation structure 
review is 2005.56  
2. Australian Military Forces 
Two factors prompted the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to implement 
retention measures:   
• The gap between civilian and ADF employment conditions is closing. 
• The civilian sector strongly demands the special skills of certain ADF 
service members.57  
The main retention measure is the return of service obligation (ROSO).  ROSO 
ensures an adequate work return is obtained from those service members who received 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. p. 8-9. 
57 Australian National Audit Office. p. 15. 
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expensive training or acquired a skill that is beneficial to the civilian sector; avoids 
interruptions to the course of replacement members; and uses limited resources wisely.58   
According to the Australian National Audit Office (ANOA), the ADF considers 
retention incentives as part of an overall payment package.  It disburses separate bonus 
payments only as a last remaining effort to retain service members.  In accordance with 
the Military Superannuation and Benefits Scheme that was established in 1991, 
servicemembers are eligible to receive a retention bonus after fifteen years of service.  In 
accordance with the ALP 1998 Election Policy, the bonus is a lump sum payment that is 
equivalent to one year’s pay, and it is offered to selected personnel deemed to possess 
important skills.  Upon acceptance of the payment, the service member incurs a 5-year 
obligation to remain in the ADF.59  One disadvantage of accepting the bonus is that the 
bonus usually forces the service member over the tax limit created by the Howard 
Government.  The result is an extra 15 percent tax on the amount over their tax limit.60 
Retention usually declined after peacekeeping operations.  Just as the United 
States had retention problems after Bosnia and Kosovo, Australia had similar retention 
cases after the Australian-led peacekeeping operation in East Timor.61  In 1998 and 1999, 
the ADF personnel separation rate was 14 percent.  This was similar to the United 
Kingdom Defence Force and close in comparison to Australian entities with over 5000 
employees (ANAO).  Table Ten shows the average 1998-1999 required and actual ADF 
personnel strength for Navy, Air Force, and Army Regular and Reserve force.  As with 
the American and Canadian military forces, the ADF has retention problems in their 
positions.62  
D. SUMMARY 
Despite the state of the economy, the military has always competed with the 
private sector for high-quality individuals in certain specialized occupations such as 
                                                 
58 Ibid. p. 15-16. 
59 Australian National Audit Office. p 12-16. 
60 ALP 1998 Election Policy. p.  12 
61 Ibid. p. 17. 
62 Positions are Australia’s equivalent to occupational fields in the U.S. Marine Corps. 
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communication, languages, information technology, and aviation.  Maintaining sufficient 
manning levels in specialized areas is likely to continue to be challenging in the future.63 
The retention problems that the Marine Corps currently face are associated with 
manning decisions made during the downsizing period.  When senior enlisted personnel 
exit the Marine Corps, the remaining force will be less experienced.  In 1995, twenty-
eight percent of the enlisted force had six to twelve years of service.  Today that 
proportion is twenty-two percent.  Lower mid-career retention over the past three years 
and low accessions during the downsizing are two factors that contribute to this decrease.  
Additionally, twenty-two percent of the force has thirteen to twenty years of service.  It is 
projected that in year 2005, this level will decrease to sixteen percent due to the number 
of members soon to be eligible for retirement.  People are motivated by the numerous 
opportunities they can find through advanced education and careers in the private sector.  
Marines in retention-critical occupational specialties are not being “pushed out” of the 
Marine Corps by their experiences at a greater rate than other enlisted personnel.  Instead, 
it is more likely that they are “pulled out” of the Marine Corps by more lucrative civilian 
opportunities.64  For this reason, the military must find ways to remain competitive in 
retaining its highly skilled and trained personnel it currently has in its ranks. 
                                                 
63 ALP 1998 Election Policy p. 15. 





TABLE 3. ANNUAL AVERAGE UNITED STATES LABOR FORCE DATA 
 
United States 
Employment Status of the Civilian Non-institutional Population 
Persons 16 Years of Age and Older 
Annual Averages, 1990-2002 
(numbers in thousands) 
Year Civilian Labor 
Force 
Employed Unemployed Unemployment Rate 
1990 125,840 118,793 7,047 5.6 
1991 126,346 117,718 8,628 6.8 
1992 128,105 118,492 9,613 7.5 
1993 129,200 120,259 8,940 6.9 
1994 131,056 123,060 7,996 6.1 
1995 132,304 124,900 7,404 5.6 
1996 133,943 126,708 7,236 5.4 
1997 136,297 129,558 6,739 4.9 
1998 137,673 131,463 6,210 4.5 
1999 139,368 133,488 5,880 4.2 
2000 142,583 136,891 5692 4.0 
2001 143,734 136,933 6801 4.7 
2002 144,863 136,485 8378 5.8 
Source: From United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics website: 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/at.txt   January 6, 2003 
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TABLE 4. ARMY RETENTION-CRITICAL OCCUPATIONS 
 





1 E25 13F Fire support specialist 
2 E04 13P Fire direction specialist 
3 E20 31F Network switching syst. operator 
4 E10 31S Satellite comm. syst. Operator 
5 E10 35M Radar repairer 
6 E61 63B Wheeled vehicle mechanic 
7 E60 67T Helicopter repairer 
8 E82 77F Petroleum supply specialist 
9 E55 92Y Unit supply specialist 
10 E22 93C Air traffic control operator 
11 E24 96B Intelligence analyst 
12 E23 98G Voice interceptor 
Source: From United States GAO, June 2001 
 
TABLE 5. NAVY RETENTION-CRITICAL OCCUPATIONS 
Priority DOD Occupation 
Code 
Navy Rating Occupation Title 
1 E66 33xx Nuclear propulsion plant operators 
and supervisors 
2 E21 17xx (EW) 
78xx(AW) 
Electronic warfare technicians and 
systems operators 
3 E23 92xx(CTI) 
91xx (CTR) 
Cryptologic technicians 




5 E13 04xx (STG) (STS) Sonar technicians 




Nonnuclear electronics technicians 
7 E22 69XX (AC) Air traffic control 
8 E43 53XX Divers 
9 E19, E67, E62 47XX (IC) Interior communications technicians 
10 E60 AME Aviation structural mechanics 
Source: From United States GAO, June 2001. 
25 
  








1 E22 1C1X1 Air traffic control 
2 E25 1C2X1 Combat control 
3 E20 1A3X1 Airborne communications 
4 E20 3CC2X1 Communications systems control 
5 E05 1T2X1 Pararescue 
6 E22 1A4X1X Air battle management system 
7 E23 1N3XXX Crypto linguist 
8 E24 1N0X1 Intelligence applications 
9 E22 1C6X1 Space systems operation 
10 E25 1C4X1 Tactical air command and control
11 E24 1N1X1 Intelligence imagery analysis 
12 E23 1N4X1 Signals intelligence analyst 
13 E55 1N5X1 Electronic signals intelligence 
exploitation 
14 E42 1W0X1X Weather 
15 E10 2A1X4 Airborne surveillance radar 
systems 
16 E60 2A5X2 Helicopter maintenance 
17 E19 2A5X3C Bomber avionics systems 
18 E60 2A6X1B Aerospace prop, turboprop and 
turboshaft 
19 E60 2A6X3 Aircrew egress system 
20 E10 2E1X1 Satellite wide-band telemetry 
systems 
21 E66 3E0X2 Electrical power production 












1 E10 6463 Radar test station technician 
2 E10 2823 Technical controller 
3 E10 6032 Fixed wing aircraft flight 
engineer 
4 E24 0211 Counterintelligence specialist 
5 E24 0251 Interrogator/debriefer-translation 
specialist 
6 E60 6035 Aircraft power plants test cell 
operator, fixed wing 
7 E10 2834 Satellite communications 
technician 
8 E10 2832 Criminal investigator 
9 E43 2336 Explosive ordnance disposal 
technician 
10 E83 5821 Criminal investigator 
11 E24 7314 Unmanned aerial vehicle operator
12 E05 7372 First navigator 
13 E20 7382 Airborne radio 
operator/loadmaster 




TABLE 8. FIRST-TERM ENLISTED RETENTION RATES 
  FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 
Army  40.2 38.7 41.8 39.6 38.2 38.3 
Navy 33.5 37.4 36.2 36.3 38.6 43.5 
Air Force 41.5 39.6 37.5 36.8 36.9 41.9 
Marine Corps 21.9 21.3 21.5 21.6 21.3 25.2 








TABLE 9. FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT RATES 
  FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 
Army  41.0 48.0 45.0 43.0 
Navy 32.0 31.0 35.0 33.0 
Air Force 52.0 50.0 49.0 43.0 
Marine Corps 18.0 19.0 20.0 20.0 







































TABLE 10. AVERAGE ADF STRENGTH FOR 1998 AND 1999 
       (in thousands) 
 REQUIRED ACTUAL 
Navy - Regulars 12,748 11,973 
Navy - Reserves 2,426 227 
Air Force - Regulars 15,512 14,099 
Air Force - Reserves 2,388 2,303 
Army - Regulars 24,602 22,343 
Army - Reserves 28,371 21,486 
TOTAL - Regulars 52,862 48,415 
TOTAL - Reserves 33,185 25,016 
Source: From ANAO Audit Report 
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III. ENLISTED CAREER FORCE CONTROLS (ECFC) PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Corps uses incentives to retain high quality Marines in occupations 
that demand high skills.  In retaining Marines, we must ask ourselves three pertinent 
questions:  1) What are the skills that we must retain?  2) What Marines do we want to 
retain? And 3) What incentives do we offer to help retain these Marines?   Analyzing 
which skills to retain are important to the operational forces of the Marine Corps.  The 
Marine Corps needs to retain certain skills in order to maintain the operational 
capabilities of the force.  When the Marine Corps spend resources, whether it is time or 
money, it expects to receive a return on its investment.  Once it loses these Marines to the 
civilian sector, these human resources are usually gone forever.    
The individual Marine quality is an important variable in the retention equation.  
The focus of the Marine Corps retention plan is to focus their efforts to reenlist high 
quality Marines to reenlist in the career force.  By keeping high caliber first-termers, the 
Marine Corps benefits because they increase the knowledge capacity of the Corps.  The 
incentives must be within the Marine Corps’ budget, yet rewarding enough to keep the 
targeted Marines from leaving the Corps.  The first two questions relate to one another in 
such a way that the Marine Corps want to retain high quality Marines with important 
skills.65 
The Marine Corps began the Enlisted Career Force Controls (ECFC) Program in 
1985 to help offset the rise in the career force population.  The intent behind the program 
was twofold.  First, it was to form the Marine Corps inventory to match career force 
requirements.  Secondly, it was to create a standardized promotion tempo across all 
MOSs.  Although there are several policies and programs that support the ECFC, we will 
discuss enlisted grade shaping in the form of the Enlisted Grade Structure Review 
(EGSR) and the First-Term Alignment Plan (FTAP).   
                                                 
65 Lieutenant Colonel Byrne, Brian J. and Major Ly Fecteau.  “Manpower Requirements.”  Handout.  
November 2002. 
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The objective of this chapter is to examine elements of the enlisted career force 
controls with respect to FTAP.  Furthermore, it discusses the intent, purpose, and process 
of the Enlisted Grade Structure Review.  In addition to discussions of the purpose and 
definition of the First-Term Alignment Plan, we will cover its contents as well.  The final 
section discusses the FTAP model before providing a summary.   
B. ENLISTED GRADE STRUCTURE REVIEW 
1. Intent 
The EGSR conducted on August 27, 2002 reviewed and reconstructed MOS grade 
structures to ensure they supported force requirements.  The intent of the EGSR was to 
find a better balance between the support of MOS grade structure and operational 
requirements.  Operational requirements have priority over the MOS grade structure 
supportability.  The EGSR does not increase or decrease the number of billets in the 
Marine Corps.  It only reallocates the proportion of billets in each grade.66 
2. Purpose 
Over the last five years, many force structure reviews such as the Active Duty 
Force Structure Review Group (ADFSRG), the Force Structure Planning Group of 1999 
(FSPG-99), and major initiatives all have resulted in significant changes to the Table of 
Manpower Requirements (T/MR).  The T/MR is an automated system that encapsulates 
and displays approved Marine Corps’ Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E)67, 
T/O&E mission statements, and other associated data.68  Once Marine manpower 
planners, more specifically Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) 
and Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA), determine that numerous major initiatives 
have significantly changed the T/MR, an Officer/Enlisted Grade Structure Review is 
scheduled.  The end result of the O/EGSR is to have a pyramidal grade shape in the 
                                                 
66 Lieutenant Colonel Byrne, Brian J. and Major Robert W. Barry.  “Active Duty Officer and Enlisted 
Grade Structure Review.”  Information Paper.  13 September 2002. 
67 Table of Organization and Equipment is a basic document that describes, in billet line detail, the 
organizational manpower requirements in terms of grade, MOS, series, weapon, and billet title for civilian 
and military personnel.  This document also lists items required by the organization to perform their 
wartime mission by table of authorized materiel control number. 
68 Marine Corps Order 5311.1C.  Total Force Structure Process (TFSP).  January 14, 1999. 
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T/MR that supports operational requirements while providing equitable promotion 
opportunities among all MOSs.69 
3. Process 
The O/EGSR commenced on 27 August 2002 when the Total Force Structure 
Division (TFSD) disseminated a list of policy procedures.  The Division distributed 
EGSR Analysis Tool, FY06 (05/10) and FY07 (06/10) T/Os, billets by grade and MOS 
by responsible Occupational Field Sponsor, E8 and E9 allocation by Occupational Field 
Sponsor, Analysis Tool business rules, Officer grade structure review parameters, and 
EGSR ‘starting point’ solutions by the appropriate responsible Occupational Field 
Sponsor, skill grade flow rates (SGFR).70  According to the 12 August 2002 
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG, MCCDC) 
brief, SGFR is the ratio of one grade to the next.  For example, an SGFR of .25 for pay 
grade E6 means that four E5 billets are required to support one E6 billet.  From 
manpower viewpoint, a SGFR parameter of +10 percent and -20 percent is considered 
acceptable.71  Further explanation will follow in Chapter Four. 
Between 27 August and 23 September 2002, MOS sponsors and specialists 
conducted a grade shape development known as the negotiation phase.  The objective of 
the negotiation phase was to establish equitable grade structures while maintaining 
realistic requirements for the Marine Corps and diminishing potential adjudication issues.  
To help achieve this objective, the total number of E8 and E9 grade allocations increased 
by an estimated 465.  Occupational Field Sponsors were allotted these additional 
‘allocations.’  MOS sponsors and specialists were not allowed to exceed the SGFR and 
officer grade parameters even though they were at liberty to use all available E8 and E9 
grade ‘allocations.’  If for any reason additional E8 and E9 ‘allocations’ were requested, 
TFSD reserved the right to informally confer with M&RA to determine the supportability 
of the request prior to the distribution of additional ‘allocations.’  In the event that there 
were excess or unnecessary E8 and E9 ‘allocations,’ they were returned to TFSD as soon 
                                                 
69 Letter of Instruction (LOI) and Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) for the Active Duty 
Officer and Enlisted Grade Structure Review (O/EGSR).  Manpower and Reserve Affairs.  p 1-2. 
70 Ibid.  p. 7. 
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71 Brief to CG, MCCDC.  “Total Force Officer and Enlisted Grade Structure Review August 2002 – 
February 2003.”  12 August 2002.  
as an Occupational Field Sponsor determined that all MOSs under his supervision had 
used all necessary ‘allocations’ TFSD had provided to meet the objective.  No participant 
should have kept unnecessary E8 and E9 ‘allocations’ as this could have had a negative 
impact upon other process owners. 
TFSD and M&RA analyzed all occupational fields when the negotiation process 
was complete.  Any MOS that failed to achieve a grade shape within SGFR and/or officer 
grade parameters did not receive a favorable endorsement from M&RA and was 
forwarded for adjudication.  To prevent disruption to the EGSR process and delaying the 
timeline, disputes were handled at the lowest possible level. 
On 23 September 2003, TFSD received completed EGSR data forwarded from 
Occupational Field Sponsors.72  From 1-25 October 2003, TFSD distributed updated 
T/O&E extracts to Marine Corps Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) element advocates.  
Advocates distributed these T/O&E extracts and conducted liaison with Marine Forces 
(MARFOR).73 
MAGTF elements had until 28 October 2002 to forward adjudication requests to 
TFSD.  All requests needed the following information:  positions of the MOS Specialist, 
MAGTF element advocate, and estimate of supportability from M&RA.74 
The adjudication phase occurred 5 – 25 November 2002.  This phase consisted of 
the pre-adjudication and the adjudication phase.  Its purpose was to resolve operational 
versus manpower differences among all stakeholders involved in this process.  Issues that 
remain unanswered during the Grade Structure Review and pre-adjudication were 
forwarded for final decision to the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
Commanding General (CG, MCCDC) who holds final dispute resolution authority. 
The pre-adjudication is a decision memorandum presented before the Human 
Resources Development Process (HRDP) Council of Colonels where they vote on each 
issue.  Council members have one vote each and voting logic is as follows: 
                                                 
72 Ibid.  p. 7. 
73 Ibid.  p. 8. 
74 Ibid.  p. 8. 
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• Council of Colonels (CoC) had to come to a unanimous decision 
concerning the issue at hand, thus resolving the issue, else: 
• Colonels representing MCCDC (TFSD) and M&RA (MPP) had to agree 
in their decision over the issue, thus resolving the issue, else: 
• Issue was forwarded to CG, MCCDC for adjudication75 
Adjudication is the last resort to solving operational and manpower differences.  
Issues that are unresolved during pre-adjudication were presented in Decision 
Memorandum format to CG, MCCDC with voting results from the CoC, and all staffing 
comments enclosed.  Subject matter experts representing M&RA, MAGTF, and TFSD 
briefed CG, MCCDC as needed concerning adjudication issues.76 
The final results were staffed from 26 to 28 November 2002 and briefed to the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and CG, MCCDC. 
TFSD input all O/EGSR changes into the T/MR from 2 December 2002 to 12 
February 2003.  A February 2003 Production Run was generated, and on 31 March 2003, 
TFSD will open the T/MR for T/O Change Requests. 
All stakeholders had separate duties regarding the outcome of the EGSR.  The 
following list is an explanation of the individual responsibilities involved in the EGSR 
process. 
1. TFSD:  Acts as the police for the conduct of the EGSR.  The Division is 
responsible for establishing procedures for conducting the EGSR and subsequently seeing 
that those procedures are carried out.  This Division must also reconcile the T/MR and 
ASR and integrate all approved changes into the T/MR.  In addition to establishing 
procedures, the Division must also develop and publish a standardized format and 
procedure for submitting grade structure changes; provide extracts, by billet and PMOS, 
along with recommending Skill Grade Flow Rates and officer grade parameters to all 
Occupational Field Sponsors; organize the final adjudication process and CG, MCCDC 
dispute resolutions; and staff out T/O&E extracts of all stakeholder-recommended 
changes to the MAGTF element advocates for MARFOR agreement or comments.  One 
                                                 
75 Lieutenant Colonel Byrne, Brian J. and Major Robert Barry.  “Active Duty Officer and Enlisted 
Grade Structure Review.”  Information Paper.  13 September 2002. 
76 Ibid. 
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of the last steps in the EGSR process is for TFSD to input the final grade change results 
into the T/MR database. 
2. Manpower Plans and Policy Division (MP):  One of the first tasks MP 
Division must perform is to present the results of all pre-EGSR working groups to TFSD.  
After calculating skill grade flow rates (SGFR) and officer parameters, provide these 
items to TFSD along with ideal MOS structures.  This division must attribute the number 
of B-billets to PMOS. The attribution is then discussed with TFSD, MOS specialists, and 
occupational field sponsors for concurrence.  They must also provide TFSD 
recommended changes from the occupational field sponsors and estimates of 
supportability for these changes.  Lastly, the Division reviews adjudication packages 
from the MAGTF Element Advocates and provide appropriate supportability estimates to 
TFSD, the HRDP Council of Colonels, and CG, MCCDC. 
3. MAGTF Element Advocates:  It is important that this group must keep in 
close contact with TFSD, Sponsors, M&RA, and the MARFORs throughout the EGSR 
process.  They are to work with occupational field sponsors and MOS specialists as to 
influence requirements generated in support of MARFORs.  These Advocates should be 
prepared to provide a broad-based experience level, and should directly represent each 
MAGTF and MARFOR element.  Additionally, the MAGTF Element Advocates must 
review changes generated by Occupational Field Sponsors and MOS specialists to ensure 
supportability.  Furthermore, they must prepare, submit, and brief pre-adjudication and 
adjudication packages on behalf of the respective MAGTF element for the HRDP 
Council of Colonels and CG, MCCDC.  One of the final duties of the element is to 
prepare and submit final and approved grade changes to TFSD for input into the T/MR 
database. 
4. Occupational Field Sponsors: Together with MOS specialists, 
Occupational Field Sponsors are to identify specific MOSs under their area of 
responsibility that are outside of the M&RA determined skill grade flow rates and 
recommend appropriate grade distribution changes for them.  Sponsors should work with 
TFSD to return of request additional E8 and E9 grade ‘allocations’ during the EGSR 
process; use EGSR Analysis Tool to provide all EGSR to TFSD for consolidation and 
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staffing to MAGTF Element Advocates; and assist MOS specialists in ensuring that 
T/O&Es are analyzed and considered during restructuring efforts. 
5. MARFOR:  MARFORs review the recommended grade changes to 
guarantee operational supportability.  They also converse with MAGTF Element 
Advocates to provide concurrence and/or comments.77 
During the ten weeks following the EGSR, MOS specialists had reviewed 
129,230 billets.  Out of the 12,006 billets identified for change by the EGSR, the 
MARFORs considered 806 to have a negative impact upon mission accomplishment.  
Therefore, these 806 billets were reverted back to their initial status.78  The below is a 
summary of the changes that took place.  Cumulative grade changes are as follows: 
 
TABLE 11. AGGREGATE GRADE CHANGES BY PAY GRADE 
E-9 Increased 90* 
E-8 Increased 232* 
E-7 Decreased 494 
E-6 Decreased 608 
E-5 Increased 1,057 
E-4 Increased 4,700 
E-1 through E-3 Decreased 4,984 
Source:  22 November 2002 Information Paper 
Note:  *Source for E-9 and E-8 numbers are from the Marine Corps Administrative Message dtd 
19 February 2003.  
In all, 240 enlisted primary MOSs were reviewed and restructured.  At the 
beginning of the review, 39 of these MOSs possessed structures that had more 
requirements at higher pay grades than the pay grade directly beneath it.  An MOS 
structure of this type is considered inverted.  As mentioned earlier, this type of grade 
shape is not supportable from a manpower perspective.   
Eight hundred twenty SGFRs were calculated to conduct the review.  At the 
onset, thirty-six percent (292) of these rates were within acceptable limits, thirty-nine 
                                                 
77 Letter of Instruction (LOI) and Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) for the Active Duty 
Officer and Enlisted Grade Structure Review (O/EGSR).  Manpower and Reserve Affairs. p 2-5. 
78 United States Marine Corps.  “Active Duty Officer and Enlisted Grade Structure Review.”  Marine 
Administrative Message dtd February 19, 2003.   
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percent (322) were above acceptable limits and twenty-five percent (206) were below 
acceptable limits.  At the present time, seventy-two percent (591) are within acceptable 
limits, twenty percent (165) are above acceptable limits, and eight percent (64) are below 
acceptable limits.  From a supportability point of view, the outcome is a major 
improvement.  
The SGFRs that exceed established parameters originate in 42 enlisted primary 
MOSs.  Of these, 31 are small cell (less than 250 billets) and are very difficult to grade 
shape.  The remaining MOSs were evaluated and only five required further review.  
Furthermore, final billet changes were entered in the February 2003 Trooplist and will be 
programmed to become effective FY06. 
C. FIRST TERM ALIGNMENT PLAN (FTAP) 
1. Motivation/Thesis/Structure 
According to the article, “Reenlistment for First Term Marines” provided by 
Headquarters Battalion Career Planner, “First-term Marines are defined as ‘Marines 
serving on their initial active duty Marine Corps enlistment contract and any extensions 
to that contract.’”  First-term Marines compete for what is called a boatspace.  Each year 
Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) comes out with a number of first term Marines 
they will reenlist in each MOS.  When that MOS is filled, it is closed; therefore, no 
Marines will be allowed to reenlist in that MOS.  If this happens, a Marine must make a 
lateral move79 to another MOS if he or she wishes to remain in the Marine Corps. 
This section begins with the stated purpose and gives the reasoning behind why 
the FTAP is vitally important.  The contents provide a synopsis of important policies and 
programs that supports the FTAP.  An explanation of the model used to determine the 
number of reenlistment will follow, as well as a summary and conclusion.  
2. Purpose 
FTAP determines the number of first-term reenlistments that will be permitted in 
each of the Marine Corps’ PMOS.  It is an important tool for aligning occupational 
requirements with inventory.  In 1992, the Marine Corps found the need to update the 
                                                 
38 
79 A lateral move is a reclassification of a Marine from one career track to another. 
method used to determine the number of first-term reenlistments.  The technique the 
Marine Corps used at that time did not account for changes in personnel policy, and it 
essentially assumed that end-strength would not change from year to year.  The existing 
method would have allowed too many reenlistments during the drawdown period.  To 
rectify this problem, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and Marine Corps planners 
analyzed both FY 1992 and long-term requirements for first-term reenlistments.80 
3. Definition/ Description 
The number of first-term reenlistments for each PMOS is determined by 
comparing the requirements with inventory.  In 1992, the Marine Corps compared the 
current-year inventory in years of service (YOS), four to six, with the current-year 
requirements in the same years of service.  This process would have provided an 
inaccurate measure of desired reenlistments for the following reasons: 
• Inappropriate YOS comparisons-  Marines in their fourth year of service 
are still on their first enlistment contract, therefore should not be part of the equation of 
inventory versus requirements for the career force. 
• YOS windows too narrow-  The Marine Corps does not have sufficient 
personnel tools to match inventory to requirements in later years of service, so a wider 
YOS window is necessary. 
• Insufficient time frame for calculations-  Calculations of requirements and 
the projection of personnel inventories should be over a period longer than the current 
year.  Since reenlistments are for three to six years of service, the projections must look 
forward to years when the Marine Corps will be smaller.81 
To maximize its return on training and to minimize instability in the force, the 
Marine Corps must meet its first term reenlistment requirements in each MOS by 
reenlisting high quality first-term Marines who are recommended and qualified for 
reenlistment.  When the Marine Corps has an open FTAP MOS, an MOS for which the 
number of expected first-term reenlistments is fewer than the number of billets, selective 
reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) and lateral moves will be used to meet the requirements.  
Training costs are the basis for deciding on the proportion of SRB multiples and lateral 
                                                 
80 Determining the Number and Composition of First-Term Reenlistments:  The First-Term Alignment 
Plan (FTAP).  Center for Naval Analysis.  9 Nov 1992.  p iii. 
81 Ibid.  p iv. 
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moves used.  SRBs are normally used in open FTAP MOSs with high training costs while 
lateral moves are usually reserved for those with low training costs.82 
In the past few years, the Marine Corps has excelled in meeting its first-term 
retention goals.  In FY01, the Marine Corps was directed to reenlist 6,073 first-term 
Marines.  This goal was met nearly two months prior to the close of the fiscal year.83  
Furthermore, in FY02, the Marine Corps targeted to achieve sixty-four percent of the 
FY02 goal by the end of the first quarter.  This was met and exceeded.  It reenlisted 4,124 
FTAP Marines (69.8 percent) by 10 January 2002 that resulted in the closure of 53 of the 
214 MOSs that were open for reenlistment.84 
4. Contents 
a. Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) 
The military controls its size and the combination of senior and junior 
level personnel by controlling the number of recruits enlisted and by changing the 
compensation incentives for reenlistment after certain fixed terms.  Since reenlistment 
bonuses have proven to be a more flexible means of varying reenlistment incentives than 
base pay or retirement pay, it is offered clearly for this function.85  The Rand Corporation 
concludes that the SRB is a large and flexible portion of military compensation.  It can be 
offered to those in critical MOSs, and when the MOS is no longer considered critical, the 
Marine Corps will discontinue its offer.  The SRB not only increases retention, it helps 
persuade Marines to reenlist vice extending.86  The SRB is a premeditated commitment 
that is based primarily on a simple exchange of cooperation and rewards between the 
Marine who received a reenlistment bonus and the Marine Corps.  The Marine is 
obligated to serve a specified number of years, usually three to four, in return for the 
reenlistment bonus received.   
                                                 
82 Marine Corps Order 1220.5J.  MPP-25.  5 Apr 1993. 
83 All Marine Message 036/01.   
84 Marine Corps Administrative Message 045/02.   
85 Daula and Moffitt.  p 499 
86 All Marine Message 036/01. 
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According to a study by Matthew S. Goldberg (2001), he believes that 
Marines who are making the decision whether to reenlist are “price-takers,” meaning that 
their decisions may be affected by SRB levels.  Figure Two illustrates the supply and 
demand curves for reenlistments as a function of the SRB level.  The Marine Corps tries 
to set the SRB levels such that it equals the supply of reenlistments to the desired levels 
of demand.  If the Marine Corps sets the SRB level too low (M), then not enough 
Marines will reenlist (point A), and a shortage occurs (distance AB).  To correct the 
shortage of reenlistments, the Marine Corps must increase the SRB levels at either mid-
year, if the problem was detected early enough and if funding is available, or during the 
following year.  If the Marine Corps sets the SRB level too high (N), then too many 
Marines will want to reenlist point (D), and a surplus occurs (distance CD).  In this 
instance, the Marine Corps may suspend or delay bonus payments partway through the 
fiscal year, only to resume payments at the beginning of the following fiscal year when 
funding becomes available. 
According to Marine Corps Order 7220.24M, the SRB program was 
established to help reach and maintain a certain number of career force Marines in 
particular MOSs and certain YOS groups.  From 1982 until 2000, Marines who were to 
receive the bonus were paid 50 percent of the bonus at the time of reenlistment.  The 
remaining balance was paid in equal installments on the reenlistment anniversary date.87  
Marine Administrative Message 436/00 states that SRBs lump sum payments were 
authorized beginning in March 2000.  Furthermore, Marine Administrative Message 
375/02 dictates that starting in FY03, all SRB-eligible Marines are paid 100 percent of 
their SRB bonus in one lump sum payment.  Upon reenlisting, Marines will receive the 
full SRB owed to them.  For FY03, Zone A reenlistment bonuses are limited to $30,000. 
The program offers a monetary incentive in exchange for at least four years of service 
with the intent of the reenlistee to serve the entire four years in the MOS on which the 
Marine reenlisted.  This is important because any reenlistee who received an SRB bonus, 
and is not serving in the skill that he/she reenlisted, may not be eligible to receive future 
                                                 
87 Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.  “Navy Management and Use 
of the SRB Program.  September 1985.  p 1. 
41 
installment payments, or in case of lump sum payment, may have to refund a proportion 
of the SRB payment.88  SRB payments are calculated in the following manner:   
SRB Payments = MBPDISC X YRS X MULT, where 
  
MBPDISC = Marine’s monthly basic pay at the time of discharge or release  
                      from active duty    
YRS            = number of years, and/or fraction of year (months) of additional   
                      service for which the Marine will be obligated beyond existing  
                      obligated service times 
MULT        = SRB multiple, not to exceed 10, for the applicable PMOS  
                      designated in the current Marine Corps Bulletin 7220 series89 
For example, upon reenlistment, an SRB-eligible and recommended 
corporal (E4) infantry SMAW gunner (MOS 0351) with four years of active service 
during calendar year 2003 would receive a lump sum SRB payment of $6996 ($1749.19 
base pay multiplied by a four-year obligation multiplied by an SRB multiple of 1).  
On certain occasions, the reenlistee may be required to perform in billets 
other than the one that was authorized.  These out-of-skill assignments are necessary to 
fulfill Marine Corps mission essential requirements.  Only the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps (MMEA-8) can grant a waiver for out-of-skill assignments.  In order for a 
Marine to be eligible to receive a reenlistment bonus under the SRB program, a Marine 
must meet the following criteria: 
• Currently serving in an MOS with at least one multiple90 in at least one 
zone in the current Marine Corps Bulletin 7220 series.  These are known as SRB eligible 
MOSs. 
• Eligible and recommended for reenlistment 
• Currently holding the rank of lance corporal or above 
• Reenlisting for a period not less than four years and within three months 
after discharge or release from active military service. 
                                                 
88 Marine Corps Order 7220.24M.  p 1 – 9. 
89 Marine Corps Order 7220.24M.  Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program.7 May 1990. 
90 Appendix B shows FY03 multiples for all Marine Corps MOSs that warrant a bonus. 
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• Assigned a PMOS or have a skill that is related to an SRB eligible MOS. 
There are three control points in which Marines can reenlist throughout 
their careers.  Zone A consists of reenlistments executed between 21 months and six 
years of active military service; Zone B consists of reenlistments executed between six 
and ten years; and Zone C consists of reenlistments executed between ten and fourteen.  
We will concentrate on Zone A since we are discussing first-term alignment.  To be 
eligible for Zone A SRB, the potential reenlistee must: 
• Have completed between 21 months and six years of continuous active 
military service.  If the reenlistee has exactly six years of active military service on the 
date of reenlistment, the Marine is eligible for a Zone A bonus if a Zone A SRB bonus 
had not previously been awarded. 
• Reenlist in the Regular component of the Marine Corps for at least four 
years and when added to the remaining obligated service from the first contract, the total 
will provide a new total obligated service of six years. 
• Have not previously accepted an SRB. 
Marines must maintain their level of technical proficiency in order to 
qualify for the entire SRB bonus.  If a Marine loses his/her technical qualification due to 
misconduct, the Marine Corps recoups the unearned portion of the bonus, and the Marine 
is considered unqualified in the MOS in which the bonus was paid.  Additionally, the 
bonus MOS is removed from the Marine’s record, and future assignments in that MOS 
are prohibited.  The following are reasons a Marine can become disqualified due to 
misconduct: 
• Refusal to carry out certain duties that will maintain a proficient level of 
technical skills when the Marine agreed to do so in writing prior to receiving the bonus 
• Disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or 
civil action that causes the Marine to become technically unqualified 
• Marines who are disqualified because of their own misconduct, but whose 
MOS is not voided because they are too close to their EAS to be issued a new MOS 
• Loss of qualification under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), the 
loss of any mandatory requirements for effective MOS performance, or withdrawal of the 
minimum security clearance 
• Injuries or illness caused by acts other than work related that prevents the 
maintenance of technical proficiency and interferes with the effective performance in the 
MOS. 
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Situations arise where Marines are technically disqualified for reasons 
other than misconduct.  If the occurrence causes an injury, illness, or other impairment 
not at the fault of misconduct, the Marine is entitled to the full bonus even if the Marine 
is reassigned to a non-SRB MOS.  The Marine may keep the unearned portion of the 
bonus even when they are no longer qualified for any of the listed reasons: 
• Failure to obtain a higher qualification that was instituted after the bonus 
payment 
• Illnesses, injuries, or other impediments in which it was no fault of the 
Marine 
• Loss of security clearance if it was no fault of the Marine 
• Directed by the service to perform in an assignment that is not related to 
the bonus MOS 
• Humanitarian reassignments to other duties 
Entitlement to the bonus is lost and the Marine must refund the unearned 
portion of the bonus when the Marine voluntarily separates, but not when a Marine 
becomes pregnant and a temporary reassignment out of the bonus MOS occurs. 
The Marine Corps will suspend bonus payments for Marines who reenlist 
to go to a commissioning program and have to attend an initial preparatory school.  The 
Marine is paid a prorated portion of the bonus if the commissioning program is not 
completed and the remainder of the reenlistment is served in the bonus-eligible MOS.   
b. Lateral Move Program 
In accordance with Marine Corps Order 1220.5J, a lateral move is a 
reclassification of a Marine from one career track to another.  This usually occurs at the 
end of a Marine’s enlistment contract.  Lateral moves conducted in conjunction to first-
term reenlistment in the Marine Corps are called an FTAP lateral move.  Where there are 
open FTAP boatspaces, the Marine Corps fills those boatspaces by using the SRB 
program and lateral moves.  The composition of boatspaces filled depends on training 
cost.  If training costs are high, SRBs are used.  If training costs are low, lateral moves 
are used.  Marines must meet the prerequisites in Marine Corps Order 1200.7L (MOS 
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Manual) for the MOS involved.  Lateral moves into restricted or closed FTAP MOSs are 
not approved.  FTAP lateral moves have priority for lateral move school seats.91 
Prior service personnel will only be allowed to reenlist if they already 
possess the necessary training in a PMOS that the Marine Corps has a shortage of 
personnel, and for those boatspaces which cannot be filled by SRB or lateral moves from 
active duty Marines.  Also, Marines conducting a voluntary lateral move incur service 
obligation requirements posted in Marine Corps Order 1500.12L.  Lateral move service 
obligation requirements have priority over career progression service obligation.92 
c. Broken Service Selective Reenlistment Bonus (BSSRB) Program 
 The Broken Service Selective Reenlistment Bonus (BSSRB) Program is 
designed to provide a monetary incentive to prior service Marines with critical skills that 
left the Marine Corps and would like to return to active duty.  Prior service Marines who 
are eligible for the BSSRB are offered 60 percent of the current bonus paid to active duty 
Marines at the time of reenlistment in the MOS.93   
 Marine Administrative Message 025/01 states that only prior service 
Marines are eligible for BSSRB.  In order for prior service Marines to be eligible for 
BSSRB, the below criteria must be met: 
• Successful completion of one Marine Corps contract with a reenlistment 
code of RE-1A. 
• Completion of 17 months to six years of active duty 
• Must reenlist between 91 days and 365 days from the active duty release 
date. 
• Must reenlist in the regular Marine Corps for at least a four-year period 
• Must meet the reenlistment criteria set forth in Marine Corps Order 
P1040.31H   
• Must not be in a reserve component status of K4, K8, K9, KF, B1, B2, B3, 
B4, or B594 
                                                 
91 Marine Corps Order 1220.5J.  p 1,3, & 4. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Marine Administrative Message 025/01. 
94 Individual Ready Reserve prior service Marines are eligible. 
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• Must reenlist in their original PMOS 
• Must reenlist under the authority of an FTAP boatspace 
• Must reenlist as the rank of lance corporal or above 
• Have not received a Zone A bonus  
 BSSRB Marines are paid the corresponding multiple at the time of 
reenlistment.  The formula for computing the amount of the BSSRB is as follows: 
BSSRB  =  BP  x  YEAR  x  MULT  x  .6, where as 
 
BP          is Monthly base pay at discharge 
YEAR    is Reenlistment contract length (in years) 
MULT    is Current Zone A multiple found in MCBUL 7220 
.6            is 60 percent of the SRB paid to active duty Marines 
 
 All BSSRB awards are limited to $18,000.00.  One hundred percent of the 
award, minus taxes, is paid no less than 30 days after time on station at the Marine’s first 
permanent duty station.  The remainder of the award is paid annually on the reenlistment 
date in equal installments.95 
d. Quality Reenlistment Program 
The Quality Reenlistment Program is designed to “place” those Marines 
who are retained in excess of the planned FTAP boatspaces.  It also takes into account 
that MOS school seats may not be available which will delete available boatspaces in 
specific MOSs.  This program authorizes 150 quality reenlistments with the following 
provisions: 
• The 150 reenlistments cannot exceed the total number of authorized 
boatspaces under the current fiscal year FTAP. 
• Quality reenlistments within an MOS should not exceed five percent of 
the total boatspaces in that MOS.  If the five percent is equal to less than one boatspace 
then the MOS is allocated one quality reenlistment. 
                                                 
95 Marine Administrative Message 025/01. 
46 
• Until all boatspaces are used, the use of quality reenlistments should not 
be made in an MOS. 
• Every effort should be made to reenlist quality reenlistment Marines to a 
lateral move boatspace they are qualified to fill before they are reenlisted under the 
Quality Reenlistment Program.96 
5. First Term Alignment Plan Model 
Close to only two months into FY02, the FTAP was already over fifty-nine 
percent complete.  By November 30, 2002, the Marine Corps had reenlisted over 3,500 of 
the 5,900 needed to reach the FTAP goal.97 
There were two main concerns as to why the Maine Corps asked the Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA) to examine the FTAP methodology.  The first was the change in 
personnel policy.  There was a fear that the model assumptions were no longer valid.  
Secondly, the model restricted comparisons to current-year inventories and current year 
requirements.98 
Marine Corps manpower planners pay close attention to the first reenlistment 
point for many reasons.  One reason is that Marines who reenlist become part of the 
Marine Corps career force.  Since the Marine Corps want the most qualified Marines to 
enter the career force, the Marine’s commanding officer is required to certify that the 
Marine is “recommended and eligible” for reenlistment.  A second reason for paying 
close attention to first reenlistment points is because the Marine Corps does not have any 
checkpoints between the first reenlistment and retirement to balance PMOS inventory 
and PMOS requirements.  Yet, a third reason is to ensure that adequate promotion 
opportunities exist.  High reenlistment rates in the 1980s decreased the promotion rate in 
many PMOSs.  Therefore, to ensure the Marine Corps does not exceed the required 
number of reenlistments allowed in the FTAP, reenlistment request for all recommended 
and eligible Marines are looked at thoroughly before processing.99   
                                                 
96 C. L. Fitzgerald.  “Guidelines and Information for Executing the FY00 First Term Alignment Plan 
(FTAP).”  Information paper.  July 27, 1999. 
97 “First Term Alignment Plan Progressing At Record Rate.” 
98 “Determining the Number And Composition of First-Term Reenlistments:  The First-Term 
Alignment Plan (FTAP).” p. 1 
99 Ibid.  p 1. 
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The overall number of first-term reenlistments has an effect on the number of 
accessions.  For example, if the Marine Corps increase the number of first-term 
reenlistees by 1500, it has to decrease its accessions by a multiple of this so as not to 
exceed end strength.  If the Marine Corps wish to downsize, it can achieve this in two 
ways- by either decreasing accessions or reenlisting fewer Marines.  By decreasing the 
number of accessions, the Marine Corps force will be more senior and the average time in 
grade becomes longer.  The first-term reenlistment point is the last opportunity, until 
retirement, for the Marine Corps to separate Marines without some type of separation 
pay. 
Manpower planners begin each fiscal year determining the maximum number of 
first-term reenlistments for every individual PMOS.  Steady-state information is used 
along with the information on FY03 inventories and requirements to determine the 
maximum number of first-term reenlistments for each occupational field.  Then the 
reenlistments are distributed among the PMOSs in the occupational fields based on 
inventories and requirements for five to seven years of service.  The Grade Adjustment 
Recapitulation (GAR) for a fiscal year supplies grade requirements for each PMOS.  It is 
better to categorize reenlistment requirements by YOS vice defining them by grade.  Yet, 
in order to do this, GAR requirements of all PMOSs must be translated into YOS 
requirements.  This process needed two distinct pieces of information:  requirements and 
inventory before first-term reenlistments.  Based on figures at the end of the fiscal year, 
requirements refer to PMOS strength requirements for Marines who are in YOS four 
through six.  Inventory before first-term reenlistments consists of the projected PMOS 
inventory of Marines in YOS four through six at fiscal year’s end.  Marines who have an 
end-of-active-service (EAS) during the fiscal year are not included in this inventory.  The 






REEN = REQSTR – PROJSTR, such that 
REEN is the required number of enlistments during the year 
REQSTR is the required strength in YOS four through six at year’s end 
PROJSTR is the projected strength without reenlistments in YOS four through six 
at year’s end100 
Marine Corps requirements and the entire career force inventory (YOS 5 through 
20) should be considered when calculating the maximum number of Marines that are 
allowed to reenlist at the end of the first term.  The Marine Corps does not have enough 
personnel tools to mirror requirements in YOS bands beyond the first reenlistment point, 
therefore, a wider YOS window for the career force is crucial.  On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, using a narrow YOS window, one that is close to the first reenlistment, will 
allow too many Marines to reenlist in subsequent years.  To remedy this problem, the 
Marine Corps would have to limit first-term reenlistments and /or accessions.  Although 
the selective use of reenlistment bonuses and voluntary or involuntary separations pay is 
an option to change continuation behavior, these tools are rather costly to use beyond the 
PMOS level of imbalance.101 
If only current-year requirements are considered when cutting end strength, future 
problems will occur.  There must be an estimated reduction in career force continuation 
rates.  For example, if from FY03 to FY08 the Marine Corps end strength decreased 
approximately 80 percent of the FY02 strength and planners based the number of first-
term reenlistments only on FY03 requirements, they will have allowed too many 
reenlistments in future years.  In essence, planners must consider present-year 
requirements and those when the force achieves steady- state. 
The current inventories for the YOS cells have been determined by previous 
Marine Corps policies.  Therefore, if requirements in a PMOS alternate over the years, 
then present inventories are an unlikely measure of how many Marines reenlisting now 
will survive to those same YOS cells.  The same theory applies to continuation patterns.  
                                                 
100 Ibid.  p 3-4. 
101 Ibid.  p. 5-6. 
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If continuation patterns alternate over time, the more senior YOS inventories will not be 
good indicators of how many Marines will continue to serve to those years.102 
The FTAP model uses a steady- state model that matches inventory to 
requirements in the YOS five through 20 category. Answers to steady-state problems 
give strength planners the number of first-term reenlistments that will fill structure 
requirements in YOS five to 20.  The model assumes that a fixed set of behaviors will 
continue indefinitely until a steady state is reached and then the solution becomes self- 
regulating.  The steady- state solution does not tell how long it takes to reach the steady-
state condition. 
The following assumptions must hold true if a given number of reenlistments, the 
steady- state estimate shows the number of these reenlisted Marines that will be in the 
relevant YOS: 
• The present continuation rates and strength policies do not change 
• The number of reenlistments are consistent over many years 
The FTAP model uses an Excel spreadsheet for model calculations.  The 
spreadsheet begins comparison in the fifth year because almost all Marines are still on 
their first enlistment; therefore, the spreadsheets ignore strength requirements in the first 
four years.  The model uses the five to 20 YOS category to determine required 
reenlistments.  Next, it calculates expected future inventories in a steady- state.  Finally, 
the model estimates base year end strength inventory of Marines in YOS five to 20 from 
the inventory at the beginning of the base fiscal year.   
On each spreadsheet is the following information: 
• Base fiscal year requirements for YOS five to 20 
• A solution must be provided for the number of first-term reenlistments 
required in the steady- state if the YOS five to 20 requirements for the base fiscal year are 
also steady- state requirements 
• Expected end strength in YOS five to 20 for the year prior to the base 
fiscal year 
• Expected end strength in YOS five to 20 for the year prior to the base 
fiscal year plus first-term reenlistments in the base fiscal year steady- state solution. 
                                                 
102 Ibid. p. 6-7. 
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Occupational fields are comprised of PMOSs.  For example, PMOSs 0311, 0313, 
0331, 0341, 0351, and 0352 compose the Occupational Field 0300.  There are 307 
PMOSs in the Marine Corps.  These PMOSs are grouped into the 38 occupational fields 
listed in Table 12.  One occupational field is put on a spreadsheet. Occupational fields 
work better than PMOSs because continuation rates are more reliable on a large number 
of Marines.  Almost all occupational fields have an inventory greater than 100 Marines 
for YOS five to 20.  In addition, there must be enough reenlistments to fill spaces to 
allow career progression in the PMOS within a career path.103 
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The outcome of the Enlisted Grade Structure Review proved to be beneficial.   
More MOSs than before will have a pyramidal grade shape.  Also there were remarkable 
improvements to the SGFR.  The “Within” SGFR increased by thirty-six percent.  This 
led to a reduction in “above” SGFR and “below” SGFR thirty-nine percent and seventeen 
percent respectively. 
Coverage of the responsibilities and duties of stakeholders involved in the 
Officer/ Enlisted Grade Structure Review process provides a look at new ways the 
process can be improved.  The EGSR created pyramidal structures for more MOSs.  In 
doing so, the likelihood increases that more quality Marines are retained.  The creation of 
more pyramidal shapes for MOSs opens more opportunities for promotion because the 
Marines do not get stagnated at one pay grade.  Once stagnation happens, demotivation 







                                                 
103 Ibid.  p. 7-9. 
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TABLE 12. OCCUPATIONAL FIELD CODES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
OCCUPATIONAL FIELD OCCUPATIONAL FIELD DESCRIPTION 




05 Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Plans 
06 Command and Control systems 
08 Field Artillery 
11 Utilities 
13 Engineer, Construction, Facilities and Equipment 
18 Ordnance 
21 Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
23 Operational Communications 
25 Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare 
26 Ground Electronics Maintenance 
28/30 Supply Administration and Operations 
31 Traffic Management 
33 Food Service 
34 Financial Management 
35 Motor Transport 
40 Data Systems 
41 Marine Corps Exchange 
43 Public Affairs 
44 Legal Services 
46 Visual Information 
55 Music 
57 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
58 Military Police and Corrections 
59 Electronics Maintenance 
60/61/62 Aircraft Maintenance 
63/64 Avionics 
65 Aviation Ordnance 
66 Aviation Logistics 
68 Meteorological and Oceanographic Services 
70 Airfield Services 
72 Air Control/Support/Antiair Warfare/Air Traffic 
73 Navigation Officer/Enlisted Flight Crews 
9919 Reporting MOSs 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Calculating new SGFRs not only changes the required number of personnel in a 
lower pay grade it takes to support the immediate higher pay grade, but it also affects the 
total requirements needed to support the MOS as a whole.  When the EGSR altered the 
structure of the enlisted pay grades, this caused a need for SRB multiples to be realigned 
as well.  The SRB multiples should change in a way as to support the new grade structure 
and help the Marine Corps save money and time via a more efficient way of retaining 
Marines. 
Depending on the restructuring of the enlisted pay grades, SRBs can change to be 
offered, or no longer offered.  It depends on the criticality of the MOS and the degree of 
difficulty in retaining Marines in that particular MOS.  For example, if an MOS is 
deemed critical, but the structure of this MOS changed such that the required number in 
the E6 pay grade decreased, then an SRB most likely would be offered but with a lower 
multiple.  Yet on the other end of the spectrum, a critical MOS that had an increase in the 
required number in the E6 pay grade would need to have a higher multiple.  When the 
Marine Corps increases the number of E6 billets in a critical MOS, essentially it saves 
money in retraining cost, but it has to offer a higher SRB multiple in order to retain these 
servicemembers.  When the Marine Corps decreases the number of E6 billets in a critical 
MOS, it must spend more money on retraining costs, but it can lower the SRB multiple 
for this MOS because it will be easier to fill the lower number of billets.   
This chapter seeks to compare the FY06 SGFRs before the EGSR with FY06 
SGFRs after the EGSR.  It will also compare the grade structure of certain MOSs before 
the EGSR with the same MOSs after the EGSR.  Furthermore, we will incorporate the 
structure changes into the FTAP model and record the results. 
B. DATA EXPLANATION 
The focus of this section is on the comparison of SGFRs for pay grades E4 
through E9 and the enlisted billet structure for pay grades E2 through E9.  Although 
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several MOSs will be discussed in regards to SGFRs and billet structure, the 13 critical-
MOSs at the end of this chapter provides the basis for discussion in this chapter. 
In this section we will discuss the composition of four lines of data:  FY06 SGFRs 
before changes from the EGSR; FY06 SGFRs after changes from the EGSR; baseline 
data before the EGSR; and baseline data after the EGSR.  Baseline data simply refers to 
the billet structure of each pay grade from E2 through E9.   
1. Pre-O/EGSR Data- Skill Grade Flow Rates and Pay Grade Structure 
In many instances, where requirements are not achievable, PMOSs are not fully 
manned.  For example, an MOS such as a Disbursing Technician in which billets are 
filled starting at the E5 pay grade requires a high first-term reenlistment rate.  This 
contributes to shortages in the MOS that directly impacts the Marine Corps’ ability to 
provide units with the Marines needed by grade and skill.104   
As explained in Chapter Three, the SGFR determines the number of Marines 
required at a lower pay grade to fill billet requirements at the next pay grade.  The 
manpower system is designed to have an SGFR of one or less.  An MOS possessing a 
SGFR of more than one is an indication that more requirements in the lower pay grade 
than in the immediate higher pay grade, thus giving it an upside down pyramid shape.  A 
more definitive explanation of the SGFR is given in Table Twenty-Five.  Table Twenty-
Six shows that prior to the EGSR, there were a total of 39 SGFRs greater than one in pay 
grades E4 through E9:  18 in pay grade E4; 14 in pay grade E5; 5 in pay grade E6; 2 in 
pay grade E7; and 0 in pay grades E8 and E9.  Appendix C lists the PMOSs that were 
above one at the E4 and E5 pay grades. 
Each pay grade has a maximum, desired, and minimum SGFR.  The maximum 
and minimum SGFRs create the SGFR-parameters for all MOSs and are calculated as 
such: 
Maximum SGFR  =  Desired SGFR X 1.1 
Minimum SGFR  =  Desired SGFR  –  [Desired SGFR X .20] 
 
                                                 
104 All Marine Message 196/96.  Enlisted Grade Structure Review.  May 21, 1996.   
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As an example, MOS 0321, Infantry Reconnaissance Man, has a SGFR of 3.183 
for pay grade E4.  Its maximum, desired, and minimum SGFRs are .804, .731, and .585, 
respectively.  This indicates that either the requirements for pay grade E4 need to be 
reduced or requirements for pay grade E3 need to be increased.  Furthermore, this MOS 
has a FY06 SRB multiple of two.  Since the targeted promotion point for pay grade E4 is 
4.5 years, near the reenlistment point, the multiple will encourage more E4s to remain in 
the Marine Corps, therefore increasing the number in this pay grade and lowering the 
SGFR. 
A PMOS that exceeds the maximum SGFR for its respective pay grade creates a 
shortage of Marines required in that pay grade and subsequently will not be able to 
support the higher pay grades.  For example, if an MOS was assigned a maximum SGFR 
of .33 for pay grade E5 but it actually possessed a .5, then this MOS will be short one 
requirement in pay grade E4 for every E5 requirement, creating a shortage of human 
resources at the E4 pay grade, thus affecting higher pay grades of that PMOS.  Table 15 
shows a total of 308 pay grades among all MOSs held SGFRs above the maximum for 
their respective pay grade:  40 in pay grade E4; 90 in E5; 111 in E6; 34 in E7; 4 in E8; 
and 29 in E9.  In other words, high SGFRs mean that there are not enough Marines in 
lower grades for the billets in the next immediate pay grade.  This leads to quick 
promotions and the need to retain a high volume of Marines.  
The minimum SGFR has the opposite effect.  When the SGFR falls below the 
minimum SGFR, a surplus of human resources occurs at that particular pay grade.  This 
surplus will lead to slower promotions if they remain in the Marine Corps.  The Marine 
Corps would have to decrease retention and accessions for this particular PMOS.  For 
example, if a PMOS was assigned a minimum SGFR of .5 for pay grade E5 but it 
actually possessed a .25, then this MOS will have a surplus of two requirements for one 
requirement in pay grade E4 for every E5 requirement.  Table 15 shows a total of 192 pay 
grades among all MOSs held SGFRs below the minimum for their respective pay grade:  
102 in pay grade E4; 17 in E5; 4 in E6; 22 in E7; 35 in E8; and 12 in E9. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the grade structure of an MOS should be 
pyramidal in shape.  Prior to the O/EGSR, 77 PMOSs (32.08 percent) had inverted 
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pyramidal shapes.  Most inverted PMOS structures occurred at the E2 or E3 pay grade.  
These two pay grades accounted for 63.64 percent of the unsupportable structures.  When 
an inverted PMOS structure occurs towards the lower pay grades, it affects the remaining 
pay grades, making it difficult to provide resources for those billets. 
2. Post-O/EGSR Data- Skill Grade Flow Rates and Pay Grade Structure 
The EGSR made significant improvements to the FY06 SGFRs.  Only MOSs 
0321, Infantry Reconnaissance Man and MOS 6463, Radar Systems Test Station 
Technician have an SGFR greater than one.  An actual increase of 8.17 percent (3.443) 
occurred in PMOS 0321, and PMOS 6463 remained constant at 2.000. 
The EGSR caused a decrease in the number of MOSs with inverted pyramidal 
structure.  Only 12.5 percent of the MOSs needs restructuring of their grade shape after 
the EGSR as opposed to 32.08 percent previously.  
C. OUTCOMES 
By restructuring the shape of billets in an MOS, the EGSR eliminates “short” 
MOSs overtime.  By eliminating “short” MOSs, high multiples would be decreased.  
Multiples were high in regards to PMOSs that had inverted pyramidal structure.  A 
possible reason for high multiples in these inverted pyramids is because the inverted 
pyramidal structure provides an unequal promotion system.  Marines in these PMOSs get 
out because they do not seem to progress, career-wise, as fast as their peers in other 
PMOSs.   
Required retention is the projected number of Marines the Marine Corps is 
scheduled to retain for a given fiscal year. The following is a summary of how the 
O/EGSR impacted the MOSs the Marine Corps deemed retention-critical for FY03: 
1. MOS 0211:  Counterintelligence Specialist 
The required retention for this MOS has ranged from approximately 59 Marines 
to 75 from FY01 to FY03.  In FY01, the Marine Corps attained approximately 65.33 
percent of the retention capacity and approximately 81.36 percent in FY02.  In Table 
Eighteen, the one-billet decrease in E7 billets will hardly slow the promotion rate from 
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E6 to E7, and the one-billet increase in E8 billets will hardly increase the promotion rate 
to pay grade E8. 
In instances where requirements are unachievable, MOSs are not fully manned.  
For example, since billets for the Counterintelligence Specialist MOS are filled starting at 
the E5 pay grade, it requires a higher first-term reenlistment rate than the Marine Corps 
can anticipate achieving, thus contributing to shortages in the MOS that directly impacts 
the Marine Corps’ ability to provide units with Marines needed by grade and skill.105 
2. MOS 0311:  Infantry Rifleman 
Required retention for this MOS held constant at approximately 500 – 530 
Marines for FY01 and FY02.  In both of these years the required retention was attained 
and slightly exceeded in FY02. 
Table Nineteen shows that billets in pay grade E4 for the Infantry Rifleman MOS 
increased by 4.89 percent, and decreased by 9.43 percent for pay grade E5.  Although this 
MOS kept its pyramidal structure, the reduction in billet at the E5 pay grade means the 
promotion rate at E4 will slow because not as many billets are available at the E5 pay 
grade.  Promotion rate to E4 will increase due to the increase in E4 billets, but then the 
promotion rate will lower for E5s due to the decrease in E5 billets.106  
3. MOS 0331:  Infantry Machine Gunner 
In FY01, the required retention for MOS 0331 was approximately 95 Marines and 
110 for FY02.  In both years retention was exceeded.  In Table Twenty, pay grades E2 
and E3 for the Infantry Machine Gunner remain unchanged after the EGSR, but pay 
grade E4 experienced a 2.38 percent increase in billets.  Furthermore, it had a 5.23 
percent decrease in E5 billets.  Marines in this MOS will experience the same promotion 
rate fluctuations as Marines in MOS 0311.107 
 





4. MOS 0621:  Radio Operator  
The required retention goal of approximately 248 Marines for radio operators was 
achieved in FY01.  In FY02 required retention decreased to approximately 240 Marines 
and the goal was attained without exceeding the required retention. 
Pay grade E2 had a 28.31 percent drop in the number of billets, as displayed in 
Table Twenty-one.  Also the structure of E3 and E4 significantly changed.  A 19.17 
percent decrease occurred in the number of E3 billets and E4 pay grade recorded a 37.20 
percent increase.  The inverted structure at the E2, E3, and E4 pay grades is 
unsupportable to Marine Fleet Forces.  This inverted shape infers that some Marines will 
be quickly promoted to E4 then the promotion rate to E5 will lower due to the lesser 
billets available for E5s.108 
5. MOS 1371:  Combat Engineer 
Required retention for the Combat Engineer MOS in FY01 and FY02 was 
approximately 102 and 99 Marines, respectively.  The required retention for this MOS in 
FY03 is approximately 100 Marines.  As depicted in Table Twenty-two, the inverted 
grade structure at the E3 and E4 pay grades deems it unsupportable at this manning level.  
This structure induces quick promotions to E4, but then would be promoted slower than 
the Marine Corps’ average to E5.  Also the 55.58 percent in the top six pay grades 
exceeds the desired 52.2 percent of the Marine Corps.109  The increase in billets for the 
E4 pay grade will increase retention and provide motivation for these Marines to continue 
their service. 
6. MOS 2336:  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician 
The Marine Corps did not attain its required retention goal in FY01 or FY02.  It 
retained approximately 62.5 percent of the required retention in this MOS in FY01 and 
88.89 percent in FY02.  Since there are no billets required in pay grades E2 through E4, 
the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician MOS must rely on lateral moves to fill its 
billets.  Table Twenty-three shows how the EGSR increased the number of E5 billets by 




6.16 percent; decreased E6 billets by 7.77 percent; decreased E7 billets by 6.35 percent; 
and decreased E8 billets by 6.90 percent.  The increase in billets at the E5 pay grade 
allows for a more equitable promotion opportunity to exist throughout the 2336 MOS. 
7. MOS 2651:  Special Intel Communicator 
Actual retention for FY01 and FY02 exceeded the required retention for MOS 
2651.  Required retention was approximately 17 Marines for FY01 and 18 Marines for 
FY02.  Furthermore, FY03 required retention is approximately 22 Marines. 
As shown in Table Twenty-four, the Marine Corps saw a 3.64 percent increase in 
billets for pay grade E4 after the EGSR and a 7.70 percent decrease in E5 billets.  This 
change shows that more Marines have an opportunity for promotion to E4, but the 
opportunity lessens when time for promotion arrives.  The opportunity for promotion 
increases again at the E6 and E7 pay grades.110 
8. MOS 2673:  Asian-Pacific Cryptologic Linguist 
In FY01, the Marine Corps retained four out of the required six Marines to attain 
66.67 percent of its required retention goal for the Asia-Pacific Cryptologic Linguist 
MOS.  For FY02, the Marine Corps broke even by attaining 100 percent of its required 
retention. 
Table Twenty-five shows how MOS 2673 had an unsupportable inverted pyramid 
structure at the E3 and E4 pay grades and also at the E4 and E5 pay grades before the 
EGSR.  The Review restructured the MOS so that it now has the ideal pyramidal shape.  
The EGSR increased the number of E3 billets by 105.88 percent and decreased E5 billets 
by 41.18 percent.  The pyramidal shape allows the opportunity for more equitable 
promotions throughout this MOS.111  
9. MOS 2834:  Satellite Communications Technician 
The Marine Corps did not attain the number of Marines it needed to reach its 
FY01 required goal of approximately 22 Marines.  Instead it retained approximately 
                                                 
110   Ibid. 
111   Ibid. 
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68.18 percent of that amount.  In FY02, the Marine Corps retained 85.71 percent of the 
required Marines, and in FY03 the retention goal is approximately nine Marines. 
There were no changes to the 2834 MOS structure as illustrated in Table Twenty-
six.  This MOS is structured such that all billets are located in pay grades E5 through E7 
and facilitates promotion equity throughout the MOS.112 
10. MOS 2862:  Electronic Maintenance Technician 
The Marine Corps attained approximately 60 percent of its required retention for 
MOS 2862.  Table Twenty-seven shows this MOS does not have billets for pay grades E2 
through E4 nor E8 and E9 prior to the EGSR.  The total number of billets for MOS 2862 
decreased from 719 to 424 (41.03 percent) after the EGSR. Pay grades E5 through E7 
was changed.  The most drastic change was at the E5 pay grade, which saw a drop from 
212 to zero.  This structure requires lateral moves into the MOS at the E6 pay grade.113 
11. MOS 3521:  Organizational Truck Mechanic 
FY01 actual-retention exceeded required retention by approximately 2.93 percent, 
while FY02 actual retention exceeded required retention by approximately 6.06 percent.  
The Marine Corps must retain 150 Marines for this MOS for FY03.  The total number of 
billets in this MOS remained the same after the EGSR as presented in Table Twenty-
eight.  Due to the fact that pay grade E4 increased by 36.95 percent and its E2 and E3 pay 
grades decreased by a combined 26.65 percent, MOS 3521 still possessed an inverted 
grade structure.  Marines in pay grades E2 and E3 will experience quick promotions, but 
then the promotion rate would fall at E5.114 
12. MOS 3533:  LVS Operator 
For FY01, the Marine Corps exceeded the required retention by approximately 
8.33 percent.  In FY02, the Marine Corps exceeded the required retention by a slightly 
lower margin of 4.55 percent.  The required retention for FY03 is approximately 66 
Marines. 
                                                 




The EGSR did not change the total number of billets in the 3533 MOS given in 
Table Twenty-nine, yet it did decrease the number of billets by 25.74 percent and 
increased E5 billets by 61.54 percent.  The post-EGSR of MOS 3533 gives a greater 
opportunity ratio for promotion to E5.115 
13. MOS 5711:  Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Specialist 
According to ALMAR 196/96, the top six enlisted pay grades are not to exceed 
52.2 percent of all billets in the MOS.  Initially this MOS had 50.33 percent of its billets 
in the top six pay grades, but with the EGSR changes to the structure, it exceeded the 
limit with 59.26 percent. 
Table Thirty shows how the EGSR changed the number of billets at each pay 
grade, yet the most significant change was at the E4 pay grade.  At this pay grade the 
number of billets increased by 43.66 percent.  The inverted pyramidal shape at the E2 and 
E3 pay grades indicates an unsupportable grade structure.  The required retention for 
MOS 5711 in FY01 and FY02 were approximately 31 and 37 Marines, respectively and 
was exceeded.  In FY03, required retention is 42 Marines.116 
D. SUMMARY 
When the EGSR structural change resulted in an increase in E3 and below billets 
with a simultaneous decrease in E4 and E5 pay grade billets for a particular MOS, SRBs 
in that MOS should decrease because there are more Marines that are capable of filling 
the higher pay grade billets.  When the EGSR structural change resulted in a decrease in 
E3 and below billets with a simultaneous increase in E4 and E5 billets for a specific 
MOS, then SRBs in that specific MOS should increase to entice Marines to reenlist.  
In critical MOSs, the multiple would have to increase due to the fact that now 
more Marines will need to be retained, especially at the lower ranks.  As you get into the 
career force, less SRB is needed because the factor of invested time comes into play on 
part of the Marines.  The more time he/she has invested in the Marine Corps the more 
likely he/she will remain on active duty.  On the contrary, the Marine Corps does not 




want to lose these individuals both because it spent years training them and because it 
invested time and money as well. 
Marines performing duties in MOSs such as 0311, Infantry Rifleman; 0331, 
Infantry Machine Gunner; or 2336 Explosive Ordnance Technician have relatively low 
training costs, therefore the Marine Corps would benefit to fill FTAP boatspaces by use 
of the lateral move program.  However, Marines in MOSs 2862, Electronic Maintenance 
Technician; 2673, Asian-Pacific Cryptologic Linguist; or 2834, Satellite Communications 
Technicians are expensive to train, therefore the Marine Corps would benefit to offer 
Marines performing duties in these type of MOSs an SRB for their continuation of active 
service.  
The EGSR restructured the billets of MOS 2673, Asian-Cryptologic Linguist, 
from an inverted pyramidal shape to a pyramidal shape.  In the near future, the grade 
distribution of this MOS would require an increase in accessions to establish a human 
resource supply of trained Marines at the E2 and E3 pay grades so that there will be 
sufficient supply of Marines to fill billets at the E4 and above higher pay grades in that 
MOS.  This will allow for the MOS to be self-supporting and decrease the need for lateral 
moves into the MOS.  The pyramidal shape allows for manpower planners to use the 
SRB to retain Marines in this MOS vice lateral moves since it is an expensive MOS in 
which to train Marines.  The influx of cash flow to this MOS would shift SRB money 
from other MOSs thus having to allocate SRB funds among more MOSs.  Without an 
increase to the Marine Corps’ budget, allocating funds among more MOSs dilutes SRB 
funding, which leads to a decrease in retention. 
A downturn of the restructure of the Asian-Cryptologic Linguist MOS, is that 
Marines in these MOSs will experience a delay in promotion to the E5 pay grade in the 
near future.  The allotment of cash flow for SRBs would have to increase because now 
Marines in this MOS no longer experience the “automatic” promotion they once had in 
the inverted pyramidal structure.  The Marines will now have to compete for a billet in 
the next higher pay grade, which will create a sense of doubt that they would be 
promoted. 
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The retention process is a complicated system with many moving parts that is in 



















Source: From Retention-critical MOSs provided by MOS Concerns Brief by Lieutenant Colonel 
Diehl, Major Bicknell, and Major Grant, Headquarters, Marine Corps.   
*Multiples provided by MCBUL 7220 Multiples for FY03 SRB Program. 
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TABLE 14. SGFR INTERPRETATION 
SGFR Interpretation 
0.3 Takes three E4 requirements to make one E5 requirement 
0.5 Takes two E4 requirements to make one E5 requirement 
1 Takes one E4 requirement to make one E5 requirement 
2 Takes one E4 requirement to make two E5 requirement 








TABLE 15. PRE-EGSR NUMBER OF SGFRS OUTSIDE NORMAL 
PARAMETERS BY PAY GRADE 
 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 Total 
SGFR > 1 18 14 5 2 0 0 39 
Above Maximum SGFR 40 90 111 34 4 29 308 
Below Minimum SGFR 102 17 4 22 35 12 192 
Source: From Final O/EGSR Results for Marine Forces.  Excel Spreadsheet.  Headquarters, 







TABLE 16. POST-O/EGSR NUMBER OF SGFRS OUTSIDE NORMAL 
PARAMETERS BY PAY GRADE 
 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 Total 
SGFR > 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Above Maximum SGFR 16 34 56 25 6 22 159 
Below Minimum SGFR 23 10 2 16 5 2 58 
Source: From Final O/EGSR Results for Marine Forces.  Excel Spreadsheet.  Headquarters, 
Marine Corps Spreadsheet.  November 20, 2002. 
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TABLE 17. POST-O/EGSR PERCENT DECREASE OF SGFRS OUTSIDE 
NORMAL PARAMETERS BY PAY GRADE 
 
 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL 
SGFR > 1 94.44 92.86 100.00 100.00 N/C N/C 94.87 
Above Maximum SGFR 60.00 62.22 49.55 26.47 *50.00 24.14 48.38 
Below Minimum SGFR 77.45 41.18 50.00 27.27 85.71 83.33 69.79 
Source:  Final O/EGSR Results for Marine Forces.  Excel Spreadsheet.  Headquarters, Marine 
Corps Spreadsheet.  November 20, 2002.  Note:   




TABLE 18. MOS 0211: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 0 0 0 184 120 80 17 0 
SGFR     .652 .667 .213  
Post-EGSR 0 0 0 184 120 79 18 0 
SGFR     .652 .658 .228  
Source:  Headquarters, Marine Corps 
 
 
TABLE 19. MOS 0311: INFANTRY RIFLEMAN 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 3817 5056 2617 1623 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .295 .620     
Post-EGSR 3817 5056 2745 1470 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .309 .536     
Source:  Headquarters, Marine Corps 
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TABLE 20. MOS 0331: INFANTRY MACHINE GUNNER 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 744 771 587 344 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .387 .586     
Post-EGSR 744 771 601 326 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .397 .542     




TABLE 21. MOS 0621:  RADIO OPERATOR 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 1074 1586 1121 783 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .421 .698     
Post-EGSR 770 1282 1538 974 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .750 .633     




TABLE 22. MOS 1371:  COMBAT ENGINEER 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 741 591 502 362 152 129 49 18 
SGFR   .377 .721 .420 .849 .380 .367 
Post-EGSR 946 184 678 386 170 111 52 17 
SGFR   .600 .569 .440 .653 .468 .327 
Source:  Headquarters, Marine Corps 
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TABLE 23. MOS 2336:  EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TECHNICIAN 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 0 0 0 146 90 63 29 10 
SGFR     .616 .700 .460 .345 
Post-EGSR 0 0 0 155 83 59 31 10 
SGFR     .535 .711 .525 .323 




TABLE 24. MOS 2651: SPECIAL INTEL COMMUNICATOR 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 0 143 110 91 43 21 9 3 
SGFR   .769 .827 .473 .488 .429 .333 
Post-EGSR 0 143 114 84 44 23 9 3 
SGFR   .797 .737 .524 .523 .391 .333 




TABLE 25. MOS 2673: ASIAN-PACIFIC CRYPTOLOGIC LINGUIST 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 0 17 27 34 14 8 0 0 
SGFR   1.588 1.259 .412 .571   
Post-EGSR 0 35 28 20 10 7 0 0 
SGFR   .800 .714 .500 .700   
Source:  Headquarters, Marine Corps 
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TABLE 26. MOS 2834: SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 0 0 0 67 31 22 0 0 
SGFR     .463 .710   
Post-EGSR 0 0 0 67 31 22 0 0 
SGFR     .463 .710   







TABLE 27. MOS 2862: ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 0 0 0 212 318 189 0 0 
SGFR     1.500 .594   
Post-EGSR 0 0 0 0 252 172 0 0 
SGFR      .683   







TABLE 28. MOS 3521: ORGANIZATIONAL TRUCK MECHANIC 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 646 1236 793 631 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .421 .796     
Post-EGSR 634 852 1086 734 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .731 .676     
Source:  Headquarters, Marine Corps 
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TABLE 29. MOS 3533: LVS OPERATOR 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 222 858 404 169 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .374 .418     
Post-EGSR 222 858 300 273 0 0 0 0 
SGFR   .278 .910     







TABLE 30. MOS 5711: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL 
SPECIALIST 
 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Pre-EGSR 65 313 142 116 61 44 15 5 
SGFR   .376 .817 .526 .721 .341 .333 
Post-EGSR 33 277 204 122 63 39 17 6 
SGFR   .658 .598 .516 .619 .436 .353 




































V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The increase of FTAP billets each year is essentially an increase in labor cost 
(wage increase).  As the number of required first-term enlisted servicemembers increase, 
so does labor cost.  The Marine Corps’ budget must also increase in order to 
accommodate this increase in labor costs.  If the budget remains relatively the same and 
the required number of first-termers continues to increase, then less labor will be 
demanded causing a decrease in the number of Marines.  As the wage increases, less 
labor is demanded “overall” which will reduce the number of Marines in the Marine 
Corps because the limited budget will not allow an increase in career force numbers.  The 
result is that Marines will have to either do more with less number of Marines or find a 
substitute such as technology to replace the void of personnel. 
The grade structure of enlisted billets has a more profound affect on the retention 
of Marines than does the skill grade flow rate.  Grade structure ultimately determines 
how many Marines can be promoted to the next pay grade, yet the skill grade flow rate 
tells how many Marines are required in one pay grade to fill one billet in the next pay 
grade.  Therefore, the more Marines that are required at the lower rank, the lower the 
percentage of Marines that are promoted.  The First-Term Alignment Plan provides an 
incentive to keep those Marines that the Marine Corps considers important to the mission. 
My prior hypothesis is that since the EGSR changed some of the grade structures 
from inverted to the normal pyramidal shape, the review has a positive impact on FTAP.  
The positive impact is increased retention, saving money for the Marine Corps, and more 
equitable promotions among the Marine Corps’ military occupational specialties. 
Retention will increase due to more equitable promotions among all MOSs.  
Marines in the old “slow” promoting MOSs are more likely to remain on active duty 
because they no longer feel as though they are not progressing (career-wise) as their peers 
who are in “faster” promoting MOSs. 
The Marine Corps saves money by not offering large numbers of SRB bonuses 
and spending money on retraining from within the Marine Corps.  Marines feel their 
promotions are fair which contributes to a high retention rate.  Therefore, leading to a 
decrease in the need for the Marine Corps to offer SRB bonuses.  Although it will not 
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eliminate the need to pay Marines bonuses, it can lead to a decrease.  More equitable 
promotions will occur since the Marine Corps will have more MOSs with the “standard” 
pyramidal shape.  The logical pyramidal shape is a better fit for facilitating promotions. 
One would think that if the desire of the Marine Corps is to have MOSs with 
pyramidal shapes, then the SGFR should decrease as you move up in pay grade.  It does 
not work that way.  The pyramidal shape is looking at the number of billets in a pay 
grade.  The SGFR is an underlying premise of how to construct that number.  Different 
factors come into play when obtaining the SGFR.  Factors such as the civilian sector 
“pull” on Marines in high skilled MOSs, the job may become more challenging as rank 
increases, therefore more bodies are needed at lower pay grades to fill the higher pay 
grades. 
Also the longer Marines stay in, the less likely it is that they will leave.  
Therefore, this is an individual that is not leaving the Marine Corps, so the Marine Corps 
does not need the “multiple human resource” at the immediate lower rank to replace this 
individual.  But the Marine Corps does need to start training those Marines that are two 
or three pay grades below in order to replace those who are near retirement. 
A. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EGSR AND THE FTAP PROCESS 
1. Strengths 
• The Marine Corps allotted itself a buffer as far as the amount of Marines it 
retains over the planned FTAP boatspaces.  This buffer is called the Quality Reenlistment 
Program.  Marines who are in excess of the projected number of boatspaces will be 
placed in a billet. 
• The FTAP model is a valuable tool that provides Marine Corps planners a 
concrete number of reenlistees in which the Marine Corps needs to retain.  From this 
number, it is up to the planner, along with recruiting forces to obtain this number without 
exceeding it. 
2. Weaknesses 
• FTAP reenlists in excess of the planned projected number of first-termers.  
There is no guarantee that the actual number of reenlistees will match the projected 
number of FTAP boatspaces.  Each year the Marine Corps reenlisted an excess of the 
planned FTAP boatspaces cause the Marine Corps to pay for extra bodies.  Since the 
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Marine Corps’ budget does not increase, these funds must come from other budgets such 
as SRB funds.  
• Manpower planners and enlisted monitors “negotiate” as to which billets 
Marines are to fill.   
• The FTAP model used is eleven years old.  Although it is working 
properly in regards to projecting first-term alignment plan reenlistment numbers, 
economic factors have changed since the institution of the model in 1992. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The process seems to be in a constant state of needing an adjustment.  The process 
has a systematic approach to achieving the required number of first-term reenlistments, 
which is proven by the accomplishment of first-term goal each year.  The Marine Corps 
must ensure to utilize the process to maintain a balance between the needs of the Marines 
Corps without retaining too many Marines. 
The EGSR should be held approximately every four to six years. This will allow 
the Marine Corps to implement any changes the Review made and analyze the effects the 
changes had on retention.   Four to six years also allow planners to record the effects on 
operational supportability. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current FTAP model is eleven years old.  Economic factors have changed 
since the implementation of the model in 1992.  For instance, technology was not created 
at the fast pace as it is today.  The validity of the CNA model should be studied in order 
to verify that it is still the most effective method of determining the required number 
first-term reenlistees. 
 
A quantitative analysis should be done to measure the quantitative effects the 
Officer/Enlisted Grade Structure Review has on the First-Term Alignment Plan retention 
requirements.  The analysis should concentrate on inserting the data outcome of the 
O/EGSR into a mock Grade Adjustment Recapitulation (GAR). 
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During the course of this study, the topic of retention of second-term Marines 
arose.  While attrition is low for second-term Marines, many on their second enlistment 
tour do not seek a second reenlistment. The Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (STAP) is 
provides a monetary incentive in the form of a bonus, to Marines who are approaching 
the end of their second tour of duty.  Although the STAP is a relatively new retention 
tool, a study can be performed on what factors are creating the low reenlistment at the 
second reenlistment point. 
The EGSR determines, by MOS, the number of billets in each pay grade.  Based 
upon the career force structure requirements and estimated inventory, the FTAP is a fiscal 
year manpower plan that specifies the number of first term Marines by primary MOS 
(PMOS) the Marine Corps must reenlist to become part of the career force.  Each year 
since the inception of the FTAP, the Marine Corps has experienced a minor rise in the 
number of first term Marines to be retained for transition into the career force.  As the 
career force increases in size relative to the total force, the Marine Corps must not only 
increase its Manpower budget, but also examine the implications of an older and 
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